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Border Crossings: Understanding
the Civil, Criminal, and Immigration
Implications for Battered Women Fleeing
Across State Lines with Their Children
CATHERINE F. KLEIN,* LESLYE E. ORLOFF**
& HEMA SARANGAPANI***
I. Introduction
A. The Need to Relocate
The period immediately following an individual's decision to leave her
abusive partner is often accompanied by a significant escalation in danger
to the safety and welfare of the survivor and her children.' While some
survivors are able to navigate legal and social services systems to access
basic legal protection, shelter and other emergency benefits, survivors
* Catherine F. Klein, faculty member at the Columbus School of Law of the Catholic
University of America, where she is director of the Families and the Law Clinic. Professor Klein
has written numerous articles on domestic violence, family law and clinical education, and
developed curricula for training on domestic violence here and abroad.
** Leslye E. Orloff, associate vice president and director of the Immigrant Women
Program at Legal Momentum, a national policy advocacy organization and technical assistance
provider on the legal rights of immigrant victims of domestic violence sexual assault and traf-
ficking. Ms. Orloff is the co-founder of the National Network to End Violence Against
Immigrant Women, and founder of Clinica Legal Latina.
*** Hema Sarangapani, a third-year student at Northeastern University School of Law, has
interned with the Immigrant Women Program at Legal Momentum, the Northwest Women's
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1. See Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, A.K.A., Why Abuse Victims Stay, 28
CoLo. LAW 19 (1999).
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fleeing their abusers generally face numerous systemic obstacles to attain-
ing the physical, emotional, and economic security they need during this
critical period. For immigrant survivors of violence leaving their abusers,
additional barriers of linguistic and cultural differences, limited access to
public benefits, and a fear of deportation can significantly magnify the
difficulty of accessing critical protective services.2
For survivors who attempt to establish a safe, new life for themselves
and their children in the community or geographic area to which they are
accustomed, the threat of an abuser's violent retaliation is never far away.
Civil or criminal protection orders may deter some abusers from retaliat-
ing against their former partners. However, for many survivors, physical
violence, stalking, harassment, threats of violence, and threats to take
away the children frequently occur in violation of such orders, long after
a survivor's decision to leave her abusive partner.3 The abuser's disregard
of prohibitions on such behavior, coupled with the difficulties in enforc-
ing protection orders, only serve to empower the batterer to continue his
abusive tactics.' Many survivors, determined to put an end to their ex-
partner's continuous attempts to maintain control over their lives, decide
to flee with their children to a confidential out-of-state location to truly
regain safety and autonomy.
The decision to flee the state may mean an opportunity to live with
extended family members who will offer a survivor and her children a
safe, caring, supportive, and familiar environment while she is healing
from the physical and psychological injuries resulting from the abuse.
Moving to find shelter with friends or relatives offers many immigrant
victims safety in a culturally and linguistically comfortable environment.'
While the decision to flee a pattern of abuse and regain physical, emo-
tional, and economic autonomy in a location unknown to the abuser may
appear to be in the best interest of the survivor and her children, many sur-
vivors and their advocates may be surprised to learn of the severe legal
consequences that may arise. Individuals who, without the consent of the
2. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 1020 (1993);
See generally LEGAL MOMENTUM, BREAKING BARRIERS: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO LEGAL RIGHTS
AND RESOURCES FOR BATTERED IMMIGRANTS (Leslye E. Orloff & Kathleen Sullivan eds., 2004)
[hereinafter BREAKING BARRIERS].
3. BUEL, supra note 1, at 19.
4. SARAH COLSON & PETER FINN, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS:
LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT 2, 7 (1990).
5. Presentation of paper by Angela Brown on "Domestic Violence in Context: A Forum
on Race, Immigration, and Poverty," University of New Hampshire, 6th International Family
Violence Research Conference (1999) (noting that immigrant women and women of color who
flee their abusers most often choose to move to houses of friends or family members rather than
use domestic violence shelters).
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other parent, leave with their children to confidential locations in or out of
their home state may face serious criminal penalties under state parental
kidnapping statutes.6 Further, survivors may also face restrictive state civil
statutes on child custody as well as related case law that encourage adverse
custody decisions to penalize parents who deprive the other parent of
access to or contact with their children.7
Legislative reform of numerous state criminal and civil statutes that
affect survivors who flee the state with their children has been possible.
Currently, many states have special statutory provisions that require con-
sideration of domestic violence perpetrated against the fleeing parent as a
mitigating factor or defense in criminal parental kidnapping proceedings
and/or against adverse custody decisions.
This article will provide an overview of the impact of state criminal
parental kidnapping or custodial interference statutes on immigrant sur-
vivors of domestic violence who already have left or wish to leave their
state with their children.8 Specifically, it will discuss the jurisdictional
laws that relate to interstate custody; criminal implications of intrastate
versus interstate custodial interference; the varying applicability of custo-
dial interference statutes for parents who do and do not have court-ordered
custody of their children; statutory exceptions or defenses available to sur-
vivors of domestic violence facing prosecution on charges of criminal
parental kidnapping; and immigration consequences related to a convic-
tion under such statutes. This article will also provide an overview of the
implications of interstate parental relocation on civil family court custody
determinations. The article will conclude with a discussion of ethical
issues that may arise for lawyers representing survivors who flee from
violence with their children.
6. Parental kidnapping statutes may also be referred to as custodial interference, child
snatching, or child abduction statutes. Most state criminal statutes distinguish parental kidnap-
ping from general child abduction and address these crimes in separate statutes. While many
general state kidnapping statutes are designed to be inapplicable to parental kidnapping cases,
it is always advisable to check your state's relevant kidnapping and custodial interference
statutes for the most current and accurate information on the statutory applicability to your
client's case. For a compilation of parental kidnapping statutes current through November 2004,
see chart in Appendix A.
7. See, e.g., Joan Zorza, "Friendly Parent" Provisions in Custody Determinations, 26
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 921, 923 (1992); Clare Dalton, When Paradigms Collide: Protecting
Battered Parents and Their Children in the Family Court System, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION
COURTS REV. 273 (1999).
8. Battered immigrants who flee to another country with their children to escape abuse will
face complex international custody law and jurisdiction provisions. For an extensive discussion
on the implications of fleeing the country with one's children, see LEGAL MOMENTUM, The
Implications of the Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Cases and Practice, in
BREAKING BARRIERS, supra note 2, at § 6.3.
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B. A Brief Overview of the UCCJA, UCCJEA, and the PKPA
Fleeing abuse with a child across state lines for reasons of safety may
not automatically justify the removal of the child in the eyes of the court.9
Survivors who are contemplating flight from domestic violence should
have a basic understanding of the laws that govern interstate custody mat-
ters before they leave. 10 Lawyers working with clients who have fled or
are contemplating flight from abuse should have a working knowledge of
legal issues and protections that arise under the following provisions
related to interstate custody:
* The applicable state jurisdictional law-Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)" or Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)12
" The federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)"3
* State criminal custodial interference/parental kidnapping statutes,
and
" State civil custody/visitation statutes and case law addressing the
impact of relocation on custody/visitation determinations when
domestic violence has occurred.
14
This article begins with a basic overview of three types of statutes gov-
erning custodial jurisdiction that commonly arise in interstate custody
proceedings: the UCCJA, the UCCJEA, and the PKPA. 5 Generally, these
statutes help courts to determine which state has the authority to make or
enforce a custody decision when the children and their parents do not all
reside in the same state. They do not provide guidelines to assist courts in
determining who gets custody or what kind of visitation arrangements
should be made. State custody provisions and the UCCJA, UCCJEA and
PKPA jurisdictional statutes apply equally to both immigrant and nonim-
migrant women.
9. Similarly a battered woman whose child is abducted by the batterer must be well
informed of the legal basis for securing the expedient return of the child.
10. NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INTERSTATE CUSTODY: UNDERSTANDING
THE UCCJA, THE UCCJEA, AND THE PKPA (1999).
11. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (1968), 9 U.L.A. Part I pp. 115-331 (1988)
[herein after UCCJA].
12. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (1997), 9 U.L.A. Part I pp.
257-94 (1999 Supp.) [hereinafter UCCJEA].
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2004) [hereinafter PKPA].
14. See generally The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges-Family
Violence Department at http://www.ncjfcj.org/dept/fvd.
15. For an extensive discussion of the impact of jurisdictional statutes on survivors of vio-
lence, see generally Deborah M. Goelman, Shelter From the Storm: Using Jurisdictional
Statutes to Protect Victims of Domestic Violence After the Violence Against Women Act of 2000,
13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 101 (2004).
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1. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT (UCCJEA)
The UCCJEA, created in 1997 to help reconcile discrepancies between
the previous UCCJA and federal laws such as the PKPA and the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA), has replaced the UCCJA in thirty-nine
states and the District of Columbia. 6 The UCCJEA is limited to jurisdic-
tional questions and does not address resolution of the merits of a custody
case. 17 The UCCJEA uses the following four categories to determine
which state has the authority to hear or enforce a custody issue: home state
jurisdiction, significant connection jurisdiction, more appropriate forum
jurisdiction, and default jurisdiction. Home state, § 102(7), is the state in
which a child lived with a parent for at least six consecutive months
immediately before the initiation of a child custody proceeding, regardless
of where the parent and child currently live. Section 201(a)(1) provides
that a state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination
if it is the home state of the child when the action is filed. The home state
jurisdiction takes priority, except in the case of emergencies.
Section 201(a)(2) provides for significant connection jurisdiction where
a court of another state does not have home state jurisdiction or a court of
the home state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this
state is the more appropriate forum. A court may decline jurisdiction if it
determines that the child and at least one parent have a significant connec-
tion with another state. A significant connection is more than mere physical
presence and can be demonstrated by substantial evidence concerning the
child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships in this state.
Section 201 (a)(3)°provides for jurisdiction when all courts having juris-
diction under the home state and significant connection jurisdictional pro-
visions have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of
this state is the more appropriate forum to determine custody. Section
201(a)(4) provides for default jurisdiction where none of the states in
which the parents and child had lived could properly exercise jurisdiction
under any of the first three jurisdictional requisites.
The UCCJEA positively impacts survivors of domestic violence in sev-
eral ways. Under the UCCJEA, a court may exercise emergency jurisdiction
in cases where the child is present in the state and the child, or a parent
or sibling of the child, has been abused by the other parent. 18 This expands
16. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, UCCJEA, at http://
www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uccjea.asp.
17. The UCCJA was designed to promote the "best interests" of the child whose custody was
at issue by discouraging parental abduction and providing that the state with the closest connec-
tions to the child should decide custody. The language was not intended to address the merits
of the custody case itself. To eliminate confusion, this language was removed from the UCCJEA.
18. "Emergency jurisdiction" is the temporary power of a court to make decisions in a case
to protect a child from harm. See UCCJA § 3(a)(3)(ii); UCCJEA § 204; 28 U.S.C. §
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the basis for emergency jurisdiction provided for by the older UCCJA by
acknowledging abuse against a parent and offering some protection to a
battered parent who decides to escape from her abuser with her children.
While a temporary emergency jurisdiction order is still subject to the actual
"home" state's issuance of a final custody order, the UCCJEA encourages
states to decline jurisdiction when invoking jurisdiction may compromise
the safety of a parent or her children.' 9 A court can decline jurisdiction on
the basis that the state is an inconvenient forum to hear the matter, and that
another, more appropriate, forum exists.2' When making inconvenient forum
decisions, the first factor a court must consider is "whether domestic vio-
lence has occurred and is likely to continue... and which state could best
protect the parties and the child."2 If a court of the home state declines
jurisdiction, the UCCJEA allows a temporary emergency jurisdiction order
to become permanent, once the issuing state becomes the home state.22
Further, under both the UCCJA and UCCJEA, a court may decline to
hear a case if the party making the request appears to have "unclean
hands," or has acted wrongfully with respect to the custody matter at
hand. The UCCJEA, however, clarifies that "[d]omestic violence victims
should not be charged with unjustifiable conduct for conduct that occurred
in the process of fleeing domestic violence, even if their conduct is tech-
nically illegal. 23
2. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT (UCCJA)
Created in 1968, the UCCJA was designed to foster uniformity among
the state laws governing jurisdiction over, and modification and enforce-
ment of, child custody determinations through provisions aimed at mini-
mizing or preventing parental kidnapping, forum shopping, jurisdictional
conflicts, and re-litigation of custody decisions issued by courts in other
states. States that have not yet adopted the UCCJEA retain the UCCJA.24
The UCCJA specifies which court may decide a custody case, and does
not govern the substance of how such a case should be decided. The primary
feature of the UCCJA was the codification of the four bases by which a
1738A(c)(2)(C)(ii). This type of jurisdiction is temporary and is invoked for the sole purpose of
protecting the child, as well as the child's parent or siblings, under the PKPA and UCCJEA,
until the state that has jurisdiction enters an order. Thus, an order issued by a court exercising
"emergency jurisdiction" is not a permanent order regarding custody or visitation.
19. See Goelman, supra note 15 at 114.
20. UCCJEA § 207(a) (1997).
21. UCCJEA § 207(b)(1).
22. UCCJEA § 204.
23. UCCJEA § 208, Comment at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ucc-
jea97.htm.
24. See Legal Information Institute, Uniform Matrimonial and Family Laws Locator-
UCCJA, at http://www.law.comell.edu/uniform/vol9.html for links to state UCCJA statutes.
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court may assume jurisdiction over a custody matter: home state, signifi-
cant connection, emergency, and default jurisdiction.15 While the statutes
are similar, under the UCCJA, a court may only exercise emergency juris-
diction if the child is physically present in the state, and the child has been
abandoned, or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because
the child has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse,
or is otherwise neglected.26
When a battered client flees to a UCCJA state to escape abuse, the best
initial move may be to attempt to secure temporary emergency jurisdiction
in their new state.27 Under the UCCJA, emergency jurisdiction is not
explicitly applicable if the other parent abused the fleeing parent,but not the
child. In such a situation, strong advocacy is necessary to secure emergency
jurisdiction and convince the other court, the court of the home state, to
decline jurisdiction. In some states, the state version of the UCCJA or case
law extends emergency jurisdiction to cases involving domestic violence
where a parent was abused or threatened, even if the child was not physi-
cally abused. Further, while domestic violence is not explicitly included
as a factor for declining jurisdiction in the home state, case law in many
states has held that courts may consider domestic violence in making
inconvenient forum decisions.
Additionally, the "clean hands doctrine" permits courts to decline to
exercise jurisdiction where a party has wrongfully taken the child from
another state or engaged in similar misconduct. While cases in many
states have held that the "clean hands doctrine" should not be used to
penalize victims of domestic violence who flee across state lines with
their children to escape abuse, a survivor runs the risk that a court may
find that she has acted with "unclean hands" under such circumstances. 28
25. Jurisdiction in custody cases in all states is based on the grounds specified in the state
UCCJEA or UCCJA. Immigration status of any party or any child is not relevant to jurisdiction
in custody or other family law cases. See Immigration Status and Family Court Jurisdiction, in
BREAKING BARRIERS, supra note 2, at § 6.5.
26. Id.
27. See UCCJA § 3(a)(3)(ii).
28. See generally Goelman, supra note 15. See, e.g., Alexander v. Ferguson, 648 F. Supp.
282, 287 (D. Md. 1986) (failing to consider domestic violence in making a jurisdictional deci-
sion after a survivor fled the jurisdiction and commenced custody proceedings in another state);
Dymitro v. Dymitro, 927 P.2d 917 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996) (finding that mother had overstated
father's violent temper and that the court was entitled to consider mother's removal of son from
Idaho contrary to UCCJA); Malik v. Malik, 638 A.2d 1184 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (finding
that mother's conduct in fleeing Pakistan with children was reprehensible despite her allegations
of abuse and the existence of a civil protection order protecting the victim and her children). But
see In re Thorensen, 730 P.2d 1380, 1387 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (finding mother's flight from
violence to counterbalance the "clean hands doctrine"); Vachon v. Pugliese, 931 P.2d 371
(Alaska 1996) (holding that mother's flight with child to a safe state was not custodial interfer-
ence or wrongful conduct); Fox v. Fox, 225 Cal. Rptr. 823 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that where
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3. PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT (PKPA)
The PKPA is a federal law enacted in 1980, largely motivated by the
same principles as state UCCJA and UCCJEA statutes,29 to discourage
interstate conflicts over custody, deter interstate abductions, and promote
cooperation between states about interstate custody matters. As part of the
Violence Against Women Act of 2000 (VAWA II), the PKPA's definition
of "emergency jurisdiction" was broadened to cover domestic violence
cases in a manner consistent with the UCCJEA. The PKPA is a "full faith
and credit" statute. It tells courts when to honor and enforce custody deter-
minations issued by courts in other states or Native American tribal juris-
dictions. Unlike the UCCJA or UCCJEA, the PKPA does not instruct
courts as to when they should exercise jurisdiction over a new custody
matter. Rather, courts must follow the PKPA (1) when they are deciding
whether to enforce a custody determination made by a court in another
state or tribe; (2) when they are deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction
even though there is a custody proceeding already pending in another
jurisdiction; or (3) when they are asked to modify an existing custody or
visitation order from another jurisdiction.3 °
The PKPA recognizes continuing jurisdiction in the state that issued
the initial custody determination. A court may modify a custody or visita-
tion order from another state if it has jurisdiction to do so, and the court
of the initial state no longer has, or has declined to exercise, jurisdiction
over the custody matter.3'
While the PKPA does not explicitly carry criminal consequences, the
Federal Fugitive Felon Act does operate in conjunction with the PKPA to
locate parents who have crossed state lines with their children without the
knowledge or consent of the other parent.32 The implications of the appli-
mother fled out of fear of father, her flight to California was not reprehensible or objectionable
conduct under the statute); O'Neill v. Stone, 721 So. 2d 393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding
that victim's departure was in the context of domestic violence and that she did not leave the
state to circumvent the court-ordered visitation schedule); Swain v. Vogt, 206 A.D.2d 703 (N.Y.
1994) (holding that victim was permitted to remove child because of her husband's abuse.
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2004).
30. Id. at § 1738A(c), (g); See generally Immigration Status and Family Court Jurisdiction,
supra note 25.
31. Id. The PKPA does not define "jurisdiction under the law of such State." It is likely that
when the PKPA was enacted, this provision referred to the UCCJA, and that it now also
includes the UCCJEA. Some advocates have argued, however, that this could refer to a state's
protection order statute. Courts have not ruled on such an argument.
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2004); 42 U.S.C. §§ 653-55, 663 (2004); 18 U.S.C. § 1073
(2004) (Parental kidnapping and interstate or international flight to avoid prosecution-"(a) In
view of the findings of the Congress and the purposes of sections 6 to 10 of this Act ... the
Congress hereby expressly declares its intent that section 1073 of title 18, United States Code,
apply to cases involving parental kidnapping and interstate or international flight to avoid pros-
ecution under applicable State felony statutes").
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cability of the Federal Fugitive Felon Act on survivors of domestic vio-
lence fleeing across state lines with their children to escape from abuse are
discussed below.
II. Criminal Parental Kidnapping Statutes
Parental kidnapping or custodial interference statutes are generally
designed to ensure parents equal access to their children by criminally
sanctioning a parent who hides the child from the other parent. 33
Currently, almost every state criminally forbids custodial interference by
parents or relatives of the child. 34 While these statutes may share similar-
ities in name, purpose and structure, the statutory provisions concerning
definitions of lawful custodian, the availability of statutory exceptions or
defenses, and the severity of the criminal penalty for conviction vary greatly
between states. A lawyer for a survivor who has already left or wishes to
leave the state with her children should carefully consult the relevant statutes
and case law in the client's home state to best inform the client of the
potential legal ramifications of her decision to flee. The following section
will generally address the legal implications of some common approaches
taken by state statutes. Appendix A contains a summary of the language,
applicability, and penalties of state custodial interference statutes.
A. The Definition of "Custody" or "Lawful Custodian"
States vary with respect to how they define "parental kidnapping."
While some states assume that all parents inherently share joint custodial
rights to their children, others only recognize legally established custodial
relationships. Therefore, to begin assessing the potential criminal impli-
cations of a client fleeing domestic violence with her children across state
lines, it is important to determine the legal relationships that exist between
the battered client, the other parent, and the child. Depending on the state
in which she resides, factors such as whether your client is married to the
father of her children, has established paternity of the children if she is
unmarried, or has entered into a court ordered custody or visitation agree-
ment, may affect the applicability of custodial interference statutes to the
33. THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, FAMILY ABDUCTION:
PREVENTION AND RESPONSE ix (2002), at http://www.missingkids.com. NCMEC defines parental
kidnapping, also called family abduction, child abduction, or child snatching, as:
"the taking, keeping, or concealing of a child or children by a parent, other family member,
or person acting on behalf of the parent or family member that deprives another individ-
ual of his or her custody or visitation rights. Family abductions can occur before or after
a court issues a custody determination. The term custodial interference is frequently used
in criminal statutes, and the definition of the offense varies from state-to-state."
34. See Criminal Custodial Interference Statute Chart in Appendix A.
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client's particular case. The lawyer must first examine the state custodial
interference statute to see how it defines custodial relationships. Then he
or she determines whether the relationship between the client and her
abuser fits within the statutory definition. Even if the client's relationship
does not fall under the criminal statute, other serious civil consequences
may still apply. Once it has been established that their relationship falls
under the statute, the lawyer must determine whether a custody or visita-
tion order will be violated if the client flees. The following provides an
overview of the potential criminal consequences and legal options for sur-
vivors who leave in violation of a court order of custody/visitation, as well
as those who flee in the absence of any legally established order of cus-
tody/visitation.
B. Applicability of Criminal Custodial Interference Statutes
Despite common misconceptions, status as the parent and primary
caretaker of a child does not, in itself, automatically authorize a parent to
leave the state with their children without the consent of the other parent
or guardian. In many states, the absence of a legal custody order, or even
status as the sole legal custodian of a child, may not immunize an indi-
vidual from prosecution under relevant state parental kidnapping laws.
Generally, state parental kidnapping or custodial interference statutes may
be divided into the following categories of applicability:
• Only applicable with legal custody/visitation order or after com-
mencement of custody proceedings;
* Applicable with or without a legal custody order;
* Applicability ambiguous in the absence of a custody order-see
case law on applicability.
1. STATUTE APPLICABLE ONLY WITH LEGAL CUSTODY/VIsrrATION ORDER OR
PROCEEDINGS
Currently, thirteen states35 have criminal custodial interference statutes
that are only applicable in cases where custody proceedings have begun or
a valid court order of custody/visitation exists and is violated. Thus, battered
women who have not begun a custody/visitation proceeding may be able
to flee the state without facing criminal consequences. However, it should
be noted that the absence of criminal consequences does NOT eliminate
serious civil consequences, such as the likely possibility of the abuser filing
for and challenging the survivor's right to custody of the children.
35. These states are Arkansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada,
North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Utah. See Appendix A.
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2. STATUTE APPLICABLE WITH OR WITHOUT LEGAL CUSTODY/VISITATION ORDER
Several state criminal custodial interference statutes are at least partially
applicable to parents who flee with their children across state lines regard-
less of whether or not a valid custody or visitation order exists.36 These
statutes typically assume that parents inherently share equal rights to their
child regardless of whether such rights have been documented through a
custody order. These statutes are often characterized by broad definitions
of the meaning of custody that emphasize the natural rights of parents as
sufficient to merit protection under criminal custodial interference statutes.
In these states, an individual fleeing domestic violence may be subject to
criminal conviction unless she is able to invoke a statutory or common law
criminal defense in the custodial interference prosecutions.
3. APPLICABILITY AMBIGUOUS: SEE CASE LAW
Unfortunately, numerous state custodial interference statutes do not, on
their face, clearly indicate whether or not a custody or visitation order is
required to trigger applicability of the statute.37 An examination of relevant
case law may be helpful in clarifying the jurisdiction's position on the
applicability of such statutes in the absence of clear statutory language. 38
For example, in New York state, the issue of statutory applicability
remains unsettled. Interstate custodial interference is a class-E felony 39
and is established by showing that "a relative of a child intending to hold
such child permanently or for a protracted period, and knowing that he has
no legal right to do so... takes or entices such child from his lawful cus-
todian." 4 The statutory ambiguity arises in considering whether one can
"knowingly without right" take a child from its lawful custodian in the
absence of a custody order where both parents have parental rights as
established through marriage or paternity. While recent case law suggests
that conviction for custodial interference may occur even in the absence
of a custody order,41 an earlier case held that prosecutors had to prove
36. As of November 2004, these states are Arizona, California, D.C., Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois (if parents are married), Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Mexico, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. See Appendix A.
37. These states are Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Appendix A.
38. See generally Liberty Aldrich, Moving On: Relocation, Emergency Jurisdiction, and
Custodial Interference, in LAWYER'S MANUAL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPRESENTING THE
VICTIM 171, 187 (Julie A. Domonkos & Jill Laurie Goodman eds., App. Div., First Dep't of the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, 1998).
39. See N.Y. Penal Law § 135.50.
40. Id. § 135.45.
41. People v. Morel, 566 N.Y.S.2d 653 (App. Div. 1991) (upholding indictment for custo-
dial interference in the second degree despite absence of prior court order of custody/visitation).
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defendant's knowledge of a court order.42 Lawyers must consult the
appropriate state statutes and case law to determine how courts have ruled
on the applicability of custodial interference statutes to parents who flee
prior to the existence of any custody/visitation order.
C. Fleeing in Violation of a Court-Ordered
Custody or Visitation Award
All criminal parental kidnapping/custodial interference statutes apply
in the event that a survivor flees her abuser with her children in violation
of an existing legal custody or visitation order. In addition to a variety of
civil penalties, a survivor may face enforcement of the original cus-
tody/visitation order pursuant to the PKPA. The PKPA is only applicable
when a valid custody/visitation order already exists or there is an ongoing
proceeding between the parents in which a temporary custody/visitation
order has been issued.43
While the PKPA addresses numerous jurisdictional issues that arise as
parents relocate with children across state lines without the knowledge or
consent of the other parent, there are also important criminal implications
that arise from attempts to enforce state custody orders under the PKPA.
The PKPA allows requests to the Federal Parent Locator Service to locate
abductor parents and abducted children.' It also clarifies that the federal
Fugitive Felon Act applies to parental kidnapping charges that are felonies
under state law. 45 This provision can have major consequences for sur-
vivors fleeing across state lines with their children, given that a majority
of states classify interstate custodial interference as a felony. If the fleeing
parent is charged with a felony under state law, that charge may be entered
into the National Crime Information Center Database (NCIC). 4 Further,
42. People v. Lawrow, 447 N.Y.S.2d 213 (Dist. Ct. 1982) (state had to prove beyond rea-
sonable doubt that defendant had knowledge that a custody order was in place).
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2004) at http://assembler.law.comell.edu/uscode/search/index.
html. (The PKPA, which gives full faith and credit to custody determinations, is only applica-
ble in cases where a temporary or final custody or visitation award has been granted by a court).
44. The Federal Parental Locator Service is a service of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Administration for Children & Families. See http://www.acf.hhs.gov/pro-
grams/cse/newhire/fpls/fpls.htm.
45. See 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (2004).
46. Crimes may be entered into the NCIC by federal, state, and local law enforcement
agents. See http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/is/ncic.htm. ("The purpose for maintaining
the NCIC system is to provide a computerized database for ready access by a criminal justice
agency making an inquiry and for prompt disclosure of information in the system from other
criminal justice agencies about crimes and criminals. This information assists authorized agen-
cies in criminal justice and related law enforcement objectives, such as apprehending fugitives,
locating missing persons, locating and returning stolen property, as well as in the protection of
the law enforcement officers encountering the individuals described in the system").
Border Crossings 121
if that parent's whereabouts are unknown, and state or local law enforce-
ment wish to enlist the assistance of federal agents, the federal Fugitive
Felon Act allows for the issuance of an Unlawful Flight to Avoid
Prosecution (UFAP) warrant at the request of a state prosecutor.47
Survivors who are forced to flee in violation of an existing custody
order should consider seeking temporary emergency custody jurisdiction
in their destination state pursuant to the UCCJA or the UCCJEA. The
process and likelihood of successfully securing emergency jurisdiction
will vary by state depending on whether a state has adopted the UCCJEA
or UCCJA and on individual judicial discretion. Lawyers working with
battered clients who are considering moving with their children to another
state can avoid criminal consequences under the PKPA by seeking modi-
fication of existing custody or visitation order prior to leaving the state.
Counsel should carefully assess the safety of such an action for the victim
as it is likely that the abuser will be notified about the move through the
court proceedings. Such orders can also be difficult to obtain. It is impor-
tant to investigate the likelihood of success of such a court case in the
jurisdiction and advise the client accordingly. If a survivor is charged with
criminal custodial interference despite her attempt to secure temporary
emergency jurisdiction in her new state, she should consult a criminal
defense lawyer who may be able to work with prosecutors to have their
charges dismissed.48 This issue becomes even more critical for immigrant
survivors, whose immigration status or options can be severely compromised
by any form of criminal conviction.
D. Potential Defenses or Exceptions
When prosecution under a parental kidnapping or custodial interfer-
ence statute is brought against a victim of domestic violence, she may
have statutory and common law exceptions or defenses available to her.
Generally, the common law defense of "necessity" or "choice of evils" is
47. Patricia M. Hoff, Parental Kidnapping: Prevention and Remedies (1997), at hitp://
ww.w.abanet.org/ftp/pub/child/pkprevnt.txt (The requirements that must be met prior to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) commencement of a federal UFAP investigation in
parental kidnapping cases are as follows: (1) the existence of a state felony warrant; (2) proba-
ble cause [for the FBI] to believe that the fugitive has fled the jurisdiction of the wanting state;
(3) a written request from an appropriate state authority for federal assistance; and (4) the assur-
ance that the fugitive will be extradited to the jurisdiction where seeking to prosecute the state
charge. After these requirements are met, the FBI then will seek authorization for the filing of
a request for a federal UFAP warrant from the U.S. Lawyer and will present the facts to a U.S.
magistrate or judge. Once a UFAP warrant is issued, the FBI will attempt to locate the abscond-
ing parent; if the FBI locates the parent and/or children, the federal charges are dropped and
extradition and prosecution under state law will proceed).
48. See Goelman, supra note 15, at 127.
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defined as "a justification defense for a person who acts in an emergency
that he or she did not create and who commits a harm that is less severe
than the harm that would have occurred but for the person's actions. 49 A
parent facing prosecution under a custodial interference statute may
argue, for example, that her decision to flee the state and violate criminal
custodial interference prohibitions was necessary to protect herself or the
child from imminent danger from the abusive parent. A necessity defense
can be raised in any criminal case and may be used even in states that have
not codified such defenses in their statutes.
Many jurisdictions only allow limited application of a necessity or choice
of evils defense. If the defendant attempts to present such a defense, case
law requires that it should fail if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to
violating the law.5" Under this standard, a survivor must demonstrate that
her choice to violate interstate custodial interference statutes was necessary
to prevent great harm to herself or her children at the hands of the abuser.
Since a necessity defense assumes that the defendant had explored all avail-
able legal alternatives to stopping the threat of harm prior to committing
the offense, it is conceivable that a battered woman, who flees the state with
her children without having first attempted to contact the police or secure
an order of protection, may find the defense of necessity unavailable to
her. A survivor's genuine fear that involving law enforcement or seeking
a protective order in the courts of the jurisdiction from which she fled may
result in further retaliation by the batterer may thus go unrecognized by a
court. Counsel for the victim should be prepared to present evidence of the
danger to the victim and/or her children and should consider presenting
expert testimony on the dynamics of domestic violence, the abuser's
lethality and the validity of the victim's fears in cases where the necessity
defense will be raised.
Some states have codified imminent harm defenses in their custodial
interference statutes, but specifically preclude a defendant from raising
such a defense unless she takes certain steps after the abduction, such as
informing law enforcement of the reason for the abduction as well as the
child's whereabouts and contact information.5" The rationale behind these
restrictions is to ensure that those fleeing imminent harm with their chil-
dren will then proceed through established law enforcement and justice
system channels to seek protection from abuse or to seek a change in the
custody order.52 Other states specifically preclude raising this type of a
49. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1053 (7th ed. 1999).
50. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
51. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1302 (allowing imminent harm defense if defendant
initiates a protection order or custody proceeding stating fear of imminent harm to the child).
52. See Susan S. Kreston, Prosecuting Parental Kidnapping, NCPCA UPDATE (Nat'l Ctr.
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defense if the child was taken out of the state.53
Through the efforts of advocates for battered women, fourteen states
currently have specific domestic violence related affirmative defenses to
prosecution under custodial interference statutes.54 Of these statutes, at
least five states require survivors of domestic violence to demonstrate that
they have followed particular procedures relating to their flight from the
violence as a condition for invoking the statutory domestic violence defense
to custodial interference.55
An example of typical procedural requirements for invoking a domestic
violence necessity defense is found in the California parental kidnapping
statute. The California statute is deemed inapplicable to parents who, with a
"good faith and reasonable belief that the child, if left with the other person,
will suffer immediate bodily injury or emotional harm," take or conceal
the child from the other parent.56 The California statute is notably progres-
sive in its inclusion of a fear of imminent "emotional harm" to the child,
making this statutory defense available when domestic violence has been
committed against the absconding parent.57
To establish that the custodial interference statute is inapplicable to a
survivor's case, California requires the survivor to follow certain procedures
before benefiting from this statutory immunity. The fleeing parent must
follow these procedures, which are common to several other states:
" Within a reasonable time after the taking of the child, make a
report to the office of the district attorney of the county where
the child resided before the action, including the name of the
person, the current address and telephone number of the child
and the abducting parent, and the reason for the abduction;
" Within a reasonable time, commence a custody action consistent
with the federal PKPA, the UCCJA or the UCCJEA; and
" Inform the home state DA's office of any change to the address
or telephone number of the survivor parent and the child.58
for the Prosecution of Child Abuse 1998), Vol. 11, No. 4, at 1, at http://www.ndaa.org/publi-
cations/newsletters/apri-update vol 11_no_4_1998.htm.
53. See, e.g., N. H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 633:4 (interference with custody).
54. These states include Arizona, California, D.C., Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin.
55. These states include Arizona, California, Florida, Nevada, and New Jersey. See
Appendix A for a description of these procedures. (Typically, such states may require a fleeing
parent to notify law enforcement of their reasons for fleeing, provide contact information in
their destination state, and/or initiate custody proceedings pursuant to the jurisdictional statute
in the home state).
56. CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.7 (WEST 2004).
57. Id.
58. Id. at (d). (In California, "a 'reasonable time' within which a report to the district attor-
ney's office must be made is at least 10 days[;] ... a reasonable time to commence a custody
proceeding is at least 30 days").
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Such requirements raise an immediate concern over maintaining the
confidentiality of the survivor's location and contact information so that
neither the batterer nor anyone acting for him can use the information to
find, stalk, or harm the victim and/or her children. Whereas some states, such
as California, assure confidentiality of this information in cases where the
reason for fleeing was domestic violence,5 9 numerous survivors have expe-
rienced the dangers of inadvertent disclosure of confidential information
by courts and law enforcement authorities. Counsel representing domestic
violence victims in interstate custody and custodial interference cases
should ask the court and other authorities involved to keep all contact and
location information regarding the victim confidential.
In the absence of statutory domestic violence defenses against prosecution
for parental kidnapping, eleven states provide a defense to custodial inter-
ference based on imminent danger to the welfare of the child.' Again, a
defendant may be required to follow a sequence of procedures relating to her
flight before invoking the "imminent harm to the child" defense. 61 Four
states provide only for a general "good cause" defense.62 Unfortunately,
twenty states do not provide for any statutory exception or defense to prose-
cution for parental kidnapping.63 In a jurisdiction where few or no defenses
exist, a survivor may be able to raise a common law necessity defense dis-
cussed above.
When advising a client who may be subject to charges of criminal cus-
todial interference, learn whether the state exempts domestic violence
survivors from statutory applicability, provides for a domestic violence
imminent harm defense, or only makes common law defenses available.
I. Immigration Consequences of Criminal Custodial
Interference Convictions
Avoiding custodial interference convictions is important for all battered
women.' Effective legal representation of victims is essential so that victims
59. Id. at (e). ("The address and telephone number of the person and the child provided pur-
suant to this section shall remain confidential unless released pursuant to state law or by a court
order that contains appropriate safeguards to ensure the safety of the person and the child").
60. These states are Colorado, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Hampshire,
New York, Ohio, Vermont, West Virginia, Wyoming.
61. See Appendix A.
62. These states are Alaska, Montana, Utah, and Virginia.
63. These states are Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana (kidnapping), Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire (if
interstate kidnapping), New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, and Texas.
64. See ANN BENSON, WASHINGTON DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES
OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT: AN OVERVIEW FOR CRIMINAL DEFENDERS, PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES IN
WASHINGTON STATE 1, 11 (2001). Criminal convictions for noncitizens can lead to deportation.
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can present all available defenses to the court in order to avoid a custodial
interference conviction. If the victim agrees to a plea or is ultimately con-
victed of custodial interference, this conviction can be used against her by
her abuser in subsequent child custody litigation. Such convictions can
significantly undermine the victim's ability to obtain court orders that
allow her to maintain custody of her children. In addition to these potential
consequences, immigrant survivors of violence facing charges of criminal
custodial interference must confront restrictive immigration laws that can
severely impact their immigration status.
Especially given that interstate criminal custodial interference and related
criminal charges are typically classified as felonies and tend to carry max-
imum sentences greater than one year, consequences of convictions under
such charges for noncitizen immigrant victims could include any of the
following:
" A battered immigrant can be deported if she commits any of a
wide variety of crimes;
" She could be denied Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)
immigration relief if she cannot show good moral character
because of criminal history. VAWA allows abused immigrant
spouses and children of U.S. Citizens or Legal Permanent
Residents to self-petition for lawful permanent residency and/or
avoid deportation through cancellation of removal;
" Even if she has an approved VAWA self-petition, she may be
barred from obtaining permanent residence (green card) if she
falls within one of the criminal grounds of inadmissibility;
" Her application for adjustment of status (permanent residence)
or VAWA cancellation of removal can be denied if immigration
authorities decide not to exercise discretion in her favor because
of her criminal history; and
" If deported/removed, she may be barred from returning to the
United States.65
Many actions that are not considered convictions in state courts are considered convictions
under immigration law. For example, pretrial diversion is considered a conviction under immi-
gration law any time the defendant is required to admit guilt and/or admit into evidence facts
sufficient to warrant a finding of guilt. For this reason, it is extremely important to contact an
expert on immigration law and crimes whenever you have an immigrant client who (1) has been
arrested, (2) has any history of criminal convictions, or (3) has a warrant issued for her arrest.
For advise on the immigration consequences of criminal convictions, contact The Immigrant
Women Program of Legal Momentum at IWP@legalmomentum.org or 202-326-0040.
65. See Battered Immigrants and the Criminal Legal System, in BREAKING BARRIERS, supra
note 2, at § 7.
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A. Grounds of Inadmissibility
Criminal convictions primarily affect immigration status when they
constitute grounds of inadmissibility or grounds of deportability.66 Any time
a person applies for permission to enter the United States or to change
(adjust) their immigration status to that of a lawful permanent resident
(green card holder), they must prove that they are admissible under immi-
gration law.6 7 Grounds of inadmissibility include criminal convictions.68
Grounds of inadmissibility generally apply to noncitizens in the following
situations:
" Undocumented noncitizens who entered the country illegally
and have no legal status in the United States when immigration
authorities initiate deportation/removal proceedings against them;
" Noncitizens seeking entry into the United States;
" Any noncitizen who is applying for lawful permanent resident
status.69
Thus, a battered immigrant could have her VAWA self-petition approved,
and despite that approval, be denied legal permanent residency because
she is inadmissible.70 For battered immigrants in deportation proceedings
who otherwise qualify for VAWA cancellation of removal, criminal con-
victions could lead to denial on the basis of inadmissibility.
B. Crimes of Moral Turpitude
Convictions for "crimes of moral turpitude" are another basis by which
battered immigrants fleeing domestic violence with their children may be
deprived of critical immigration benefits. Custodial interference convic-
tions, which are felonies in virtually every state, may constitute grounds
for inadmissibility or deportability as "crimes of moral turpitude" under
immigration law.
7
'
A crime of moral turpitude is commonly defined as "an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a [person]
owes to his [or her] fellow [people], or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between [people]."72 In
determining whether a crime constitutes moral turpitude, an immigration
66. See INA §§ 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182, 1227 (criminal grounds of inad-
missibility; criminal grounds for deportability).
67. See INA § 212(a)(2) (criminal grounds of inadmissibility).
68. Id.
69. BENSON, supra note 64, at 8.
70. Id.
71. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (crime of moral turpitude as criminal ground for inadmis-
sibility); INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) (crime of moral turpitude as basis for expedited removal).
72. See Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 235 n. 7 (1951).
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judge will examine the crime as defined by elements of the criminal
statute rather than considering the defendant's actual conduct.7 3 Thus, it is
possible that a survivor of domestic violence who is convicted of criminal
custodial interference, irrespective of the motivations for her actions, may
be found to have committed a crime of moral turpitude.
Generally, whether a survivor fleeing domestic violence with her chil-
dren will be convicted of a crime of moral turpitude will be dependent on
the language of the state statute. For example, in Washington State, where
flight from domestic violence is a defense to a charge of criminal custo-
dial interference, experts conclude that it is unlikely that an individual
with a custodial interference conviction will be found to have committed
a crime of moral turpitude.74 Within the context of custodial interference
statutes, only three states require malice as an element of their custodial
interference statutes. 75 An intent or malice requirement in the custodial
interference statute makes it significantly more likely that an immigrant
victim's conviction would be deemed a crime of moral turpitude under
immigration law given that an element of the crime itself is indicative of
moral turpitude.7 6 Immigrant victims in these states should take particular
care to avoid custodial interference convictions.
Even if a fleeing parent is found to have committed a crime of moral
turpitude, she may be able to maintain her admissibility under immigration
law by invoking the waiver under Petty Offense Exception waiver.77 This
exception is only available if the maximum penalty possible for the crime
the immigrant victim was convicted of does not exceed one year, and the
immigrant was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment for more than six
months. It is important to note that the key issue is the maximum penalty
for the crime and not the actual time served. Unfortunately, this exception
is generally unavailable for battered immigrants fleeing abuse with their
children across state lines because almost every state makes interstate cus-
todial interference a felony punishable by a sentence of over one year.
Another waiver available for this grounds of inadmissibility can be found
73. Goldeshtien v. I.N.S., 8 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 1993); Matter of Short, 20 I&N Dec. 136
(BIA 1989).
74. Id. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.40.060, 9A.40.070 (2004) (custodial interference in the
1st and 2nd degree).
75. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 278 (2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-4-4 (Michie 2004); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 787.03 (2004).
76. BENSON, supra note 64, at 60. While there is no definitive list of crimes that constitute
moral turpitude, they can include: crimes (felonies or misdemeanors) in which there is an ele-
ment of intentional or reckless infliction of harm to persons or property; felonies and some mis-
demeanors, in which malice is an element; or crimes in which either an intent to defraud or an
intent to steal is an element.
77. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(lI).
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under INA § 212 (h). Under this section, a crime of moral turpitude, as
well as several other grounds of inadmissibility, may be waived for a bat-
tered immigrant at the discretion of the attorney general.
C. Grounds of Deportability
Any noncitizen may be subject to deportation.78 This is true even for
immigrant victims who have lawful permanent residency (green cards).
Only after naturalization does the risk of deportation due to criminal con-
victions disappear. A battered immigrant who is convicted of custodial
interference or another crime could potentially be subject to the grounds
for removal discussed below.
1. CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE
The statutory definition of deportability as a result of conviction of a
crime of moral turpitude is:
INA § 237((a)(2)(A)(i)): Conviction for one "crime involving moral turpitude
committed within five years... of admission" to the United States (or 10 years
if admitted as a lawful permanent resident), "for which a sentence of one year
or longer may be imposed."
This ground is subject to a waiver under § 237(a)(2)(A)(v)-if "the
alien subsequent to the criminal conviction has been granted a full and
unconditional pardon by the President of the United States or by the
Governor of any of the several States."
As discussed above, a conviction of interstate custodial interference is
typically a felony offense that carries a possible sentence of over one year.
In the event that a victim is convicted of custodial interference during the
time specified, and an immigration judge deems that her crime was one that
demonstrated moral turpitude, she may be deported. To avoid deportation,
a battered immigrant would need to overcome the very high threshold of
obtaining a full and unconditional pardon by the U.S. President or State
Governor.
2. AGGRAVATED FELONY
An immigrant "convicted of an aggravated felony at any time ... is
deportable."79 The aggravated felony provision is defined by immigration
law, not state criminal law, and includes twenty-one provisions that
encompass hundreds of offenses.8" Some examples include: murder, rape,
child sexual abuse, trafficking in controlled substances, firearms offenses,
78. See INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2) (criminal offenses as grounds for depor-
tation).
79. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).
80. INA § 101(a)(43), 8 USC § 1101(a)(43).
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child pornography, obstruction of justice or perjury with a sentence of one
year or more, fraud or deceit if the loss exceeds $10,000, crimes of vio-
lence with a sentence of one year or more, and theft or burglary offenses
(including receipt of stolen property) with a sentence of one year or
more. 8 Any offense that falls within the aggravated felony definition trig-
gers drastic immigration consequences.
While most of these crimes may not appear to apply to a survivor flee-
ing abuse with her children, it is not inconceivable that a survivor in such
a situation may be charged with obstruction of justice for her failure to uti-
lize recognized channels of custodial adjudication. Additionally, in states
where malice or harm to a child are elements of the crime of custodial
interference, it is within the realm of possibility that a survivor may be
found to have committed a crime of violence. The language of these pro-
visions is as follows:
- INA § 101(a)(43)(S)---"An offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury
or subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness, for which the term of
imprisonment is at least one year."
82
Custodial interference/parental kidnapping, especially when in viola-
tion of an existing court order, may be considered obstruction of justice.
If a UFAP warrant is issued, a victim could face conviction of an aggra-
vated felony relating to obstruction of justice as another ground for
removal.
- INA § 101(a)(43)(F)-"A crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title
18) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year." 83
The definition of "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16 includes:
(1) An offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person or property of another; or (2) Any
felony that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.
3. CRIME OF DOMEsTIc VIOLENCE
Finally, it is not uncommon for batterers to obtain retaliatory or mutual
protection orders against their partners.84 Batterers frequently use protection
orders as yet another tool to control their victims by threatening to contact
the police and/or immigration authorities and falsely accuse the victim of
violating the protection order. If a victim is charged with violating the
81. INA § 101(a)(43), 8 USC § 1101(a)(43).
82. Id. § 101 (a)(43)(S), 8 USC § 1 101(a)(43)(S).
83. Id. § 101 (a)(43)(F), 8 USC § 1 101(a)(43)(F).
84. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING (2000).
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protective provisions of a civil protection order, she may be subject to
INA § 237(A)(2)(E), a grounds for removal for perpetrators of domestic
violence. It is extremely important that counsel for battered noncitizens
defend their clients in retaliatory protection-order cases brought by their
abusers.85 No noncitizen victim should ever consent to the issuance of a
protection order against her. If an immigrant victim acted in self-defense,
she should put forth her self-defense case in a contested hearing opposing
the issuance of the protective order against her. If the immigrant victim
seeks help from counsel after a consent protection order has been issued
against her, counsel should appeal the decision or seek to reopen the case
and have it dismissed. If a battered immigrant was acting in self-defense
and is charged by the Department of Homeland Security with committing
a crime of domestic violence either through self-defense or through vio-
lating her abuser's retaliatory protection order, she has the following
waiver available to her:
- INA § 237(a)(7)-Waiver for a victim of domestic violence who was not the
primary perpetrator in the relationship if, upon determination that she, (1) was
acting in self-defense; (2) was found to have violated a protection order intend-
ed to protect the alien; or (3) she committed, was arrested for, or pled guilty to
committing a crime-(a) that did not result in serious bodily injury and (b)
where there was a connection between the crime and the alien's having been
battered or subjected to extreme cruelty.
The domestic violence grounds for removal under INA § 237(A)(2)(E)
specifically excludes violations of custody or child support provisions that
may have been included under a civil protection order. Thus, a victim can-
not be charged with this basis for removal if her flight is in violation of
the visitation provision of her own civil protection order.
D. Good Moral Character
A survivor convicted of criminal custodial interference or related crimes
also risks being determined to lack good moral character, which is a factor in:
" VAWA self-petitions,
• VAWA cancellation of removal/suspension of deportation,
• Adjustment of status (e.g., to lawful permanent resident status),
and
" Naturalization.
85. For an overview of basic concepts regarding the immigration consequences of crimes
particular to immigrant survivors of violence, see ANN BENSON, OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRATION
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT FOR IMMIGRANT SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
(2004) (available through the National Immigration Project of the National Attorneys Guild at
www.nationalimmigrationproject.org or 617-227-9727).
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In each instance, the Department of Homeland Security assesses good
moral character by determining first and foremost whether the applicant has
criminal convictions. Applicants for VAWA are asked to provide evidence
that they lack criminal convictions through a state background check, police
clearance letters or fingerprints. To naturalize or become a legal perma-
nent resident, fingerprints are required, which are matched against state
and national criminal records data. Convictions for custodial interference
could make proving good moral character much more difficult.
A battered immigrant woman convicted of a crime of moral turpitude
or an aggravated felony may be ineligible for a VAWA self-petition or
cancellation of removal because she will be barred from establishing good
moral character. INA § 101(f) lists several permanent bars to establishing
good moral character. Among other things, this section includes almost
every criminal ground for inadmissibility or deportability. Noting that sur-
vivors of domestic violence may have committed crimes as a result of the
physical abuse and/or extreme cruelty they experienced at the hands of
their abusers, the Violence Against Women Act was amended to allow a
limited waiver for certain survivors of domestic violence. This provision
allows survivors of domestic violence to establish good moral character
despite being barred under INA § 101(f) when the crime that led to the bar
can be shown to be connected to the abuse suffered by the victim. 86 Consult
an immigration lawyer who is an expert on the immigration consequences
of criminal convictions to confirm whether your client's crimes may be
waivable under this provision to allow her to establish good moral character.
IV. The Impact of Interstate Flight from
Domestic Violence on Civil Custody Decisions
In addition to the threat of criminal sanctions for interstate custodial
interference, battered women who flee across state lines may be subjected
to severe civil penalties that could include modifications of the terms of
custody, or even the potential loss of custody of their children. Survivors
of violence frequently must balance risks to their physical and emotional
safety with risks to their custodial rights over their children in deciding
whether and how to leave an abusive relationship. While many jurisdictions
have begun to consider the presence of domestic violence in custody and
86. See id. at 9 (INA § 204(a)(1)(C) provides that self-petitioning applicants are not barred
from showing good moral character (GMC) where: (1) the act or conviction is waivable under
INA § 212 or INA § 237; and (2) the act or conviction is connected to the alien's having been
battered or subjected to extreme cruelty. Many survivors may find that their crimes may be
waivable under INA § 212(h)(C) or INA § 237. If this is the case, they may be able to establish
good moral character pursuant to INA § 204(a)(1)(C) if the crime, e.g., criminal custodial inter-
ference, can be attributable to domestic violence).
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relocation determinations,87 jurisdictions vary enormously with respect to
their treatment of the dynamics of domestic violence when considering
complex custody, visitation, and relocation cases. This section will provide
a brief overview of the impact of relocation on custody determinations,
and discuss options and prospects for battered women who plan to petition
the court to relocate prior to leaving the state with their children.88
A. Friendly Parent Provisions
"The most widely accepted rationale for restricting the movement of
custodial parents is that children's interests are best served by ensuring
frequent and continuing contact with both parents" after the parents sepa-
rate.89 This rational is accepted despite research findings that severely
limit this proposition in families where domestic abuse is present.
Research demonstrates that, when "domestic violence [or severe conflict]
is present between parents, children deteriorate markedly when subjected
to frequent visitation transfers."
90
In an attempt to maintain frequent and continuing contact between par-
ents, several state child custody statutes explicitly encourage courts to favor
child custody awards to the parent considered by the court most likely to
encourage an open, frequent and loving relationship between the child and
the other parent.9' Some states accomplish this by including in their custody
statute a public policy statement concerning a parent's abilities to foster
such a relationship to develop between the child and the other parent.92
Other states include such provisions in their list of factors that a court is
required to "consider when determining the best interest of the child." 93
These provisions can be harmful to battered parents seeking custody.
In jurisdictions that have these so-called "friendly parent" provisions,
battered women who intentionally flee from their abusers to protect them-
selves and their children from further harm are particularly vulnerable to
a finding of noncooperativeness in custody proceedings. Lawyers and other
advocates for battered women have vigorously opposed such "friendly
parent" provisions, and have claimed that the existence of such statutes
87. See Merry Hofford et al., Family Violence in Child Custody Statutes: An Analysis of
State Codes and Legal Practice, 29 FAM. L.Q. 197, 216 (1995).
88. See generally Janet M. Bowermaster, Relocation Custody Disputes Involving Domestic
Violence, 46 U. KAN. L. REv. 433 (1998).
89. Id. at 446.
90. Id. at 447.
91. Id. at 446.
92. See The Family Violence Project of The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges, Family Violence in Child Custody Statutes: An Analysis of State Codes and Legal
Practice, 29 FAM. L.Q. 197, 201 (1995).
93. Id.
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perpetuates an abuser's ability to use the threat of losing custody of the
children as a tool to further control the abused spouse.94 In 1995, "the ABA's
Center on Children and the Law stated that friendly parent provisions are
inappropriate in domestic violence cases, and proposed that state legislatures
amend such laws. 95 While expectations of cooperative parents persist,
the work of advocates of battered women, coupled with the judiciary's
growing awareness of domestic violence, has prompted many jurisdictions
to now consider the existence of domestic violence as a factor in making
custody determinations.96
To counter friendly parent expectations by courts and to fall within
domestic violence protections, counsel representing battered women in
contested custody cases should seek protection orders that provide evi-
dence of abuse that can help ensure that custody awards are decided
against the backdrop of the intimate partner violence.
Such orders are extremely helpful to immigrant victims for whom fear
of loss of custody of children to an abusive parent with U.S. citizenship or
more permanent immigration status can discourage her from seeking any
kind of justice system help at all.97 Protection orders can award an immi-
grant victim custody without regard to her immigration status,98 and can
provide her with important evidence that can help her immigration case.99
Most importantly, going to court and obtaining a protection order against
her abuser demonstrates to immigrant victims that despite her abuser's
claims to the contrary, the justice system will help her."°
B. Fleeing the State without the Children
As discussed throughout this article, battered parents attempting to flee
abuse with their children face myriad obstacles to safe relocation. Some
94. Id. at 202.
95. Id. See also HOWARD A. DAVIDSON, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON CHILDREN 1 (1994) (stating that children
are harmed "cognitively, psychologically, and in their social development" by witnessing
domestic violence against a parent at home).
96. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, CUSTODY AND VISITATION
DECISION-MAKING: WHEN THERE ARE ALLEGATIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1995).
97. See generally Mary Ann Dutton, Leslye E. Orloff, & Giselle Aguilar Hass, Symposium
Briefing Papers: Characteristics of Help-Seeking Behaviors, Resources and Service Needs of
Battered Immigrant Latinas: Legal and Policy Implications, 7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y
245 (2000).
98. For a fuller discussion see Protection Orders in BREAKING BARRIERS, supra note 2, at § 5.
99. For an in-depth discussion of immigration relief available for survivors of domestic vio-
lence, see Battered Immigrants and Immigration Relief in BREAKING BARRIERS, supra note 2, at § 3.
100. See Leslye E. Orloff, Mary Ann Dutton, et. al., Recent Development: Battered
Immigrant Women's Willingness to Call for Help and Police Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN'S
L.J. 43 (2003) (research has found that obtaining a protection order is a significant factor in an
immigrant victim's decision to call the police for help).
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parents are forced to leave their children behind when fleeing from a crisis
of violence due to lack of resources to support themselves and their chil-
dren, or out of fear that flight with their children may result in their batterer
successfully convincing prosecutors to initiate criminal proceedings against
them. Rather than recognizing a parent's decision to flee as a response to
imminent physical harm to the parent or her children, in such cases, a
court may read a battered woman's flight from abuse as her abandonment
of the children or as an indication of her inability to protect and care for
them. 1
0
The Model Code on Domestic Violence, drafted in 1994 by a multidis-
ciplinary advisory committee comprised of judges, battered women's
advocates, lawyers, law enforcement officers, defense lawyers and other
professionals, addresses topics including criminal penalties and proce-
dures, civil protection orders, and family and children.° 2 One of the goals
of the Model Code is to establish guidelines for child-custody determina-
tions under which, once the court finds abuse by one parent against the
other, the safety and well-being of the child and battered parent are the
primary consideration in determining a custody arrangement that would
be in the best interests of the child. 103 The Code contains, for example, a
presumption that it is not in the best interest of the child to be placed in
sole custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical custody with the perpetra-
tor of family violence, and also directs courts to give primary consideration
to the safety and well-being of the child and of the parent who are victims
of domestic violence. 1° 4 Further, the Code specifically addresses the concern
that abused parents' flight from abuse without the children might be viewed
as abandonment, and provides battered parents with an affirmative defense
against allegations of child abandonment. This approach serves to minimize
any potential disadvantage a battered parent may face in subsequent custody
proceedings. When assisting a client who has fled the jurisdiction due to
abuse without her children, consult your state's custody statute to determine
whether your client may benefit from statutory protections due to her status
as a survivor of domestic violence. Counsel should also consider present-
ing a brief to the court on this issue based on the Model Code and the
ABA Center on Children's report on recommended steps courts should
take when domestic violence exists in a custody case.
101. See Bowermaster, supra note 88, at 451.
102. See MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 402 (Nat'l Council of Juv. &
Farn. Ct. Judges 1994) [hereinafter "MODEL CODE"], at http://www.ncjfcj.org/dept/fvd/publica-
tions/main.cfmAction=PUBGET&Filename=new modelcode.pdf.
103. Id.
104. See Id. at § 402(1)(a).
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C. Fleeing the State with the Children
In addition to the criminal consequences discussed above, abused parents
who flee the state with their children prior to or in violation of a custody
order may face disadvantages in subsequent custody proceedings for
interfering with the other parent's custodial rights. °5 The survivor may
also risk offending a court's authority over the custody matter. 10 6 Some
courts have demonstrated an inability to recognize and unwillingness to
support an abused parent's decision to deprive the abusive parent of con-
tact with the children in the course of fleeing the jurisdiction for safety
reasons, even in light of extensive history of extreme physical, emotional,
and sexual abuse of the fleeing parent by the other parent. For example,
in DeCamp v. Hein, a Florida trial court focused primarily on the father's
right to visitation by refusing to grant custody to a mother who had fled
the state with her children, unless she returned to Florida. While the appel-
late court finally reversed the part of the order requiring the mother to
return to Florida, it was evidence of the mother's willingness to permit
liberal visitation with the father, rather than the long history of domestic
violence perpetrated against the mother that finally persuaded the court to
permit the relocation.' 07 Examine your state statutes and relevant case law
to develop a sense of how a court will respond in a custody proceeding
involving a parent who has fled the jurisdiction with her children to
escape abuse.
Finally, battered women who relocate with their children to avoid abuse
may confront increased penalties due to a court's perception of the vic-
tim's flight from the jurisdiction as in contempt of the court's authority.'0 8
Experts describe the story of one woman who fled with her children with-
out first informing the court out of fear that the court would punish her for
her decision:'"
Lois ran away with her 2-year-old son and hid in a battered women's shelter in
another state. Although she wrote the judge a letter explaining her continued
fear for her own and her child's safety, he became irate at her willful disrespect
of his previously issued visitation order and immediately transferred custody to
her former husband.... Nor was the risk of danger to the child important to the
judge, who was exercising his power to punish Lois for not trusting the court
to act in the best interests of her child.1 10
105. See generally Bowermaster, supra note 88.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., DeCamp v. Hein, 541 So. 2d 708 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
108. See Bowermaster, supra note 88, at 455.
109. See Lenore E.A. Walker & Glenace E. Edwall, Domestic Violence and Determination
of Visitation and Custody in Divorce, in DoMEsnc VIOLENCE ON TRiAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 127, 131 (Daniel J. Sonkin ed., 1987).
110. Id.
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As discussed earlier, defenses or exemptions currently available in
some state parental kidnapping/custodial interference statutes are very
helpful to battered women. These exceptions "direct courts not to penal-
ize ...[survivors if they] suddenly move away in violation of a court
order or... temporarily conceal the whereabouts of the children while
they [are] fleeing domestic violence."'' Family courts in some states may
take into account flight from abuse in custody proceedings pursuant to
state statutes or case law that require consideration of domestic violence
in custody cases.'12
When representing a battered custodial parent who has fled from one
state to another with her children, if the case is being litigated in a state
that considers domestic violence in custody cases, counsel should develop
and present evidence in the custody case demonstrating the nexus between
the flight, domestic violence, and the safety of the victim and her children.
If relevant, counsel should also consider providing evidence that the children
have witnessed the abuse and as a result, have been traumatized in the same
way as children who have been physically abused by a parent. In making
this argument, counsel may seek an expert witness and cite relevant
research to support the argument, as this view is increasingly the prevailing
view of experts among advocates for victims of child abuse and domestic
violence. In states without such provisions in their statutes and case law,
counsel should examine state statutes governing parental kidnapping and
custodial interference. Where domestic violence-related defenses, exemp-
tions, or exceptions exist in those statutes, advocates for battered women
should argue that consideration of those same factors in custody cases is
necessary to be consistent with the spirit and purpose of those statutes.
D. Petitioning to Relocate
For battered women in jurisdictions with particularly restrictive crimi-
nal custodial interference laws, one option is to petition a court for legal
permission to relocate. Despite establishing a pattern of abuse, battered
women who choose to seek a court's permission to relocate are not always
successful in their request. However, in recent years, the growing aware-
ness of domestic violence among the judiciary has led to an increased
number of abused parents being granted permission to relocate with their
children." 3
111. Bowermaster, supra note 88, at 458.
112. See generally Hofford, supra note 87, at 199.
113. See Bowermaster, supra note 88, at 456. Some parents are allowed to move in the ini-
tial proceeding. See Carter L.M. v. Tracey W.P., No. CN94-6456, 1995 WL 775207, at *2 (Del.
Farn. Ct. Mar. 28, 1995) (allowing woman to relocate with new husband, but requiring her to
pay all costs of visitation from Scotland because it was her decision to move); Schuyler v.
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Section 403 of the Model Code articulates a rebuttable presumption that
nonabusive parents should be the custodial parents, and that they should
be free to move with the children to the location of their choice. 1t 4 This
provision acknowledges that a battered parent may find increased safety
and support in another jurisdiction, thus supporting the notion that relocation
would be in the best interests of both the parent and child." 5 The standard
set forth by the Model Code, as well as the accompanying comments that
explain the approach taken by the National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges in making this recommendation, should be provided to the
court to encourage it to follow the lead of national judicial domestic vio-
lence experts in promoting victim safety by allowing relocation of victims
and their children in domestic violence cases." 6
While most states include "domestic violence as a statutory factor that
courts must consider when making custody determinations[,]J "7 . . . [far]
fewer have mandated that courts [1)] consider evidence of domestic vio-
lence as contrary to the best interests of the child or to a stated preference
for joint custody, or [2)] expressly prohibit an award of joint custody
when a court makes a finding that domestic violence has occurred."' 18
While some jurisdictions have established a presumption against awarding
sole or joint custody to an abusive parent, no state has yet followed the
Model Code by adopting a special statutory provision for relocation cases
involving domestic violence. '" Despite the distinct historical tendency to
preserve the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent, recent decisions
Ashcraft, 680 A.2d 765, 781-82 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996) (affirming permission to relocate on
appeal); McGee v. McGee, 637 N.Y.S.2d 816, 818-19 (N.Y.A.D. 1996) (affirming permission
to relocate on appeal); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 619 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183-84 (App. Div. 1994)
(affirming permission to relocate on appeal); Swain v. Vogt, 614 N.Y.S.2d 780, 782-83 (App.
Div. 1994) (affirming permission to remove on appeal); Jacoby v. Carter, 563 N.Y.S.2d 344,
345 (App. Div. 1990) (affirming permission to relocate on appeal); Dobos v. Dobos, 431 S.E.2d
861, 863 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming permission to relocate with child on appeal). Others
are able to relocate only after an appeal. See Odom v. Odom, 606 So. 2d 862, 869 (La. Ct. App.
1992) (reversing loss of custody on appeal); Sheridan v. Sheridan, 611 N.Y.S.2d 688, 690 (App.
Div. 1994) (reversing order to move back to retain custody on appeal); Gruber v. Gruber, 583
A.2d 434, 440 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (reversing condition of remaining in jurisdiction to retain
custody on appeal).
114. MODEL CODE § 403. Presumption concerning residence of child where there is at issue
a dispute as to the custody of a child, a determination by a court that domestic or family vio-
lence has occurred raises a rebuttable presumption that it is in the best interest of the child to
reside with the parent who is not a perpetrator of domestic or family violence in the location of
that parent's choice, within or outside of the state.
115. Bowermaster, supra note 88, at 459.
116. Id. at 459.
117. Id.
118. See The Family Violence Project of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges, supra note 92, at 217.
119. Id. at 209.
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by state supreme courts indicate a growing trend toward offering the cus-
todial parent and her children the same level of protection and respect
generally accorded to any nuclear family.1
20
The model that lawyers representing battered women should urge courts
to follow includes: not awarding custody, in whole or in part,'2 ' to a parent
with a history of inflicting domestic violence, granting visitation to such
parent only if the safety and well-being of the abused parent and children
can be protected, and including in all awards of visitation explicit protection
for the child and abused parent. 122 Family court judges across the country
who have received training on, and understand, domestic violence make
custody awards to nonabusive parents using this approach.
12 3
Unless the statutes and case law clearly include protective measures,
battered women should be prepared by counsel to understand that relief
might only be granted on appeal.'24 Since appellate relief can only be
granted if the issues have been raised at the trial level, any battered woman
seeking to relocate with her children should consider making every con-
stitutional argument to support her move.' 25 Joan Zorza suggests that a
battered woman make the following constitutional arguments supporting
her position that she should be allowed to relocate:126
Her right to travel interstate is [based] in ... the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and freedom of
120. See Bowermaster, supra note 88; See, e.g., Vachon v. Pugliese, 931 P.2d 371 (Alaska
1996); In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996) (But see In re Marriage of Navarro
& LaMusga, No. S 107355 (Cal. April 29, 2004); In re Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776 (Colo.
1996); Mize v. Mize, 621 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1993); Lamb v. Wenning, 600 N.E.2d 96 (Ind. 1992);
Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1996); Bell v. Bell, 572 So. 2d 841 (Miss. 1990);
In re Marriage of Hogstad, 914 P.2d 584 (Mont. 1996); Harder v. Harder, 524 N.W.2d 325
(Neb. 1994); Trent v. Trent, 890 P.2d 1309 (Nev. 1995); Holder v. Polanski, 544 A.2d 852 (N.J.
1988); Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996); Stout v. Stout, 560 N.W.2d 903 (N.D.
1997); Fossum v. Fossum, 545 N.W.2d 828 (S.D. 1996); Fortin v. Fortin, 500 N.W.2d 229 (S.D.
1993); Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn. 1996); Lane v. Schenck, 614 A.2d 786 (Vt.
1992); Bohms v. Bohms, 424 N.W.2d 408 (Wis. 1988); Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283 (Wyo.
1993). But see In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E.2d 1041 (111. 1988).
121. Joan Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and Confidentiality Needs of
Battered Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 273, 305 (1995).
122. Id.
123. For technical assistance developing these arguments in your custody case on behalf of
a battered woman who fled to your jurisdiction contact The National Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges at 775-784-6012 or http://www.ncjfcj.org. For help with cases involving
immigrant victims who flee, you may additionally contact the Immigrant Women Program of
Legal Momentum at 202-326-0040 or iwp@legalmomentum.org.
124. Zorza, supra note 121, at 306.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 307.
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association under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
" The denial of the relocation would impermissibly discriminate
against her on the basis of her gender, her marital status, her
being a parent of minor children, and "her being an abused per-
son who is being denied the ability to protect herself and/or her
child[ren]" in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
" "A denial of the relocation would discriminate against the
child(ren)'s right to interstate travel and, [potentially, their right]
to be protected by their custodial parent from witnessing and/or
experiencing further abuse."
" "A denial of the relocation would deny the mother her funda-
mental right to (re)marry [(if she does intend to remarry)], to
create a new family, and to enjoy the privacy of the familial
association."
" If she is not relocating to flee the father, "[t]he court could con-
sider the alternative that the father could move to be near his
child(ren) rather than restrict her from moving the child(ren)."
" "The denial of the relocation [also potentially] deprives her of
state constitutional rights" (such as fundamental rights protected
under the state constitution or the state's equal rights amendment,
if the state has one).
In addition, Zorza suggests that the abused woman be prepared to raise
her best factual arguments as follows: 127
" That the court should take domestic violence and concerns regard-
ing the safety of both the battered parent and child(ren) into
account when adjudicating any custody and/or relocation case.
" Why other solutions are not possible or will only increase the
danger to the battered woman and her child, including why she
cannot remain; what other alternatives she has explored, and
why they will not work or would involve any less hardship for
the father; and that couples counseling or family therapy will not
help, but actually further aggravates the abuser's power in the
relationship and endangers battered women and their children.
" "Anything which the abuser has done (e.g., abusing or harassing
her, not paying support, etc.) that makes it harder for her to
remain (e.g., that he has or will cause her to be evicted, lose her
job, or function less effectively as a parent)."
" "To the extent that the father has not had a very meaningful rela-
tionship with the child(ren) and/or only (or mainly) opposes the
127. Id. at 307-08.
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move to prevent her from getting on with her life, and hence has
no legally permissible reason to prevent the relocation."
" All the reasons why the move will benefit her child(ren), such
as better work prospects [for the survivor]; more emotional sup-
port from family [and friends]; better child-care options; better
financial situation, especially if she will be able to be off public
assistance; that her child(ren) used to live there and still have
contacts with friends, church, doctor, etc.; better schools for her-
self or her child(ren); better medical situation."
" If applicable, "that her child(ren) are of sufficient age to give
their consent and/or desire, or at least do not oppose, the move."
" "Any reasons why the move will be desirable/necessary for her,
including what definite plans she has for herself and her
child(ren)."
V. Custodial Interference Laws and Ethical Issues
Numerous ethical issues related to professional conduct may arise for a
lawyer representing a client whose need to find safety for herself and her
children intersects with state criminal custodial interference laws. Within
the context of a client's flight from the jurisdiction for reasons of safety,
these rules of ethics may appear to conflict with fundamental principles of
advocating on behalf of the safety and best interests of a survivor of
domestic violence and her children. Through a discussion of the scope and
applicability of relevant ethical rules of professional responsibility, this
section hopes to provide some general guidance for lawyers counseling
clients who have or are planning to flee domestic violence by leaving the
jurisdiction with their children. As emphasized throughout this article, the
applicability of these and other rules as well as their consequences are
largely fact-specific and frequently vary by jurisdiction.
A. The Rules
The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules) have been adopted in some manner by approximately forty-
one states. 18 Other states either follow the American Bar Association's
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (which preceded and was
replaced by the Model Rules) or their own combination of rules. 129 These
rules prescribe minimum standards for upholding the professional respon-
sibility of lawyers to their clients and to the profession.
128. Lewis Becker, Ethical Responsibilities of a Lawyer for a Parent in Custody and
Relocation Cases: Duties Respecting the Child and Other Conundrums, 15 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIM. LAW. 33, 34 (1998).
129. Id.
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When representing a client who has or is contemplating fleeing the state
with her children, the following two Model Rules may be triggered:
" Rule 1.2(d) 3' states: "A lawyer shall not counsel a client to
engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal con-
sequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and
may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to
determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the
law." Given the existence of custodial interference statutes that
criminalize a parent's flight from the jurisdiction, questions
arise as to a lawyer's ethical obligations when advising a sur-
vivor who wishes to flee out of state with her children.
" Rule 1.6131 describes the nature of lawyer-client privilege and its
exceptions. Lawyers representing clients who have fled the
jurisdiction with children may find themselves obligated to dis-
close their client's whereabouts to a court under one or more of
the exceptions to this privilege.
B. Rule 1.2(d)
As discussed above, jurisdictions vary with respect to the scope and
applicability of criminal custodial interference laws. The legal relation-
ship of the parents, the existence of a valid custody order, the destination
of the fleeing parent, and the reason for her flight from the jurisdiction are
just some of the variables that determine the applicability of the law as
130. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.2(d) (2002).
131. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.6 (2002):
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless
the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to
carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain
to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another
and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the
client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has
used the lawyer's services;
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules;
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge
or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was
involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client; or
(6) to comply with other law or a court order".
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well as the availability of defenses. An analysis of the ethical implications
of counseling such a client must therefore begin with an assessment of the
individual client's position with respect to relevant state statutory and
common law provisions.
Under Rule 1.2(d), a lawyer may not counsel or assist a client to engage
in criminal or fraudulent behavior. The comments that follow this rule
establish several exceptions to this general rule. This prohibition does not
preclude a lawyer from giving an "honest opinion about the actual conse-
quences" that may result from the client's conduct and suggests that a
client's use of such advice toward criminal ends does not make the lawyer
a party to such action.' Further, the rule creates an exemption for dis-
obedience of a statute or regulation or its interpretation by governmental
authorities for purposes of determining its validity or interpretation.' 33
The Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers suggests that:
Different considerations may apply when the contemplated client activity that
a lawyer counsels or assists is criminal but the client, having been counseled
that the activity is criminal, nonetheless proposes to commit the act for reasons
of conscience. The disciplinary consequences of lawyer involvement in such
instances of civil disobedience have not been adjudicated and the Restatement
takes no position on them. 1
34
While these rules place limitations on the ability of a lawyer to repre-
sent a survivor of domestic violence who wishes to flee the jurisdiction, it
is fairly clear from the comments that follow Rule 1.2(d), that simply
counseling a client on the potential ramifications of interstate flight from
abuse should not trigger disciplinary consequences. Further, the excep-
tions provided for in the comments that follow Rule 1.2(d) may present
opportunities for lawyers to challenge the applicability of criminal custo-
dial interference statutes to survivors of domestic violence whose flight
was motivated by the abuse. If a lawyer chooses to represent a client who
has fled the jurisdiction with her children, she should do so with a strong
working knowledge of defenses available for these survivors.
132. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) cmt. 9 (2002): "Paragraph (d) prohibits a
lawyer from knowingly counseling or assisting a client to commit a crime or fraud. This prohi-
bition, however, does not preclude the lawyer from giving an honest opinion about the actual
consequences that appear likely to result from a client's conduct. Nor does the fact that a client
uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent of itself make a lawyer a party to
the course of action. There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal
aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might
be committed with impunity."
133. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) cmt. 12 (2002): .... The last clause of
paragraph (d) recognizes that determining the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation
may require a course of action involving disobedience of the statute or regulation or of the inter-
pretation placed upon it by governmental authorities."
134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94 (2004).
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In jurisdictions that exempt survivors of domestic violence from their
criminal custodial interference statutes, a lawyer's counsel and repre-zen-
tation of a client who wishes to flee the state appears unlikely to violate
Rule 1.2(d). Similarly, in jurisdictions where flight from domestic vio-
lence is a defense to a charge of parental kidnapping, a lawyer's advice to
a client on the legal implications of her decision and subsequent defense
of a client who has chosen to flee also appear unlikely to violate Rule
1.2(d). Here, an understanding of when a client's actions will trigger crim-
inal custodial interference statutes may be determinative in anticipating a
defense to a Rule 1.2(d) violation. In jurisdictions where the applicability
of criminal custodial interference statutes to survivors of domestic vio-
lence is unclear, mere advice to a client on the consequences of interstate
flight should not constitute a Rule 1.2(d) violation. However, counsel for
the client should be familiar with common-law defenses to a charge of
criminal custodial interference.
1. CASE LAW: PEOPLE V. CHAPPEL
One case often cited in discussions of the intersection of domestic rela-
tions law and standards of professional responsibility is People v.
Chappel35 which illustrates what can appear to be the murky conflict
between zealous representation of a client and ethical obligations that pro-
hibit assisting a client in the commission of a crime. People v. Chappel
involved a custody dispute amidst a dissolution proceeding where a client
wished to leave the state with her children contrary to a custody order and
mutual restraining order prohibiting either party from leaving Colorado.
Chappell advised her client "as her lawyer to stay, but as a mother to
run. "136 Chappell also informed her client about underground networks
that were available to individuals in her situation, assisted her in empty-
ing her bank accounts, and advised her as to how she could avoid being
caught. The client was subsequently caught and charged with a violation
of a custody order under Colorado law, a class 5 felony. The client pled
guilty to the charge in exchange for a three-year deferred sentence. The
lawyer, however, was disbarred and her conduct was found to violate:
" R.P.C. 1.2(d) a "lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or
assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent";
" R.P.C. 3.3(a)(2) a "lawyer shall not knowingly fail to disclose a
material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client";
* R.P.C. 8.4(b) "it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to com-
135. People v. Chappell, 927 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1996).
136. Id.
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mit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects"; and
R.P.C. 8.4(c) "it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or mis-
representation."37
Despite some ambiguity as to whether the "underground" resources
provided to her client by Chappell were in fact domestic violence shelters,
there does not appear to be any evidence of a history of domestic violence
in this case. Chappell's lawyer knowingly assisted her client in illegal
conduct, including acts that far exceeded the scope of advice.
A lawyer representing a battered parent who wishes to flee the state
with her children would arguably not be in the same position as Chappell.
If such a client chooses to flee the state after being advised of the legal
implications of her decision, a lawyer could arguably rely on her good
faith belief that her client's conduct may not be found criminal under
statutory and common-law defenses available to victims of domestic vio-
lence in that jurisdiction. Further, Comment 9 to Rule 1.2(d) suggests that
a lawyer in such a position would not be implicated in the action of the
client unless there is evidence of assisting the client beyond discussion of
legal implications.138
2. CASE LAW: IN RE ROSENFELD
Nevertheless, the risk of disciplinary consequences for counsel will
most likely increase when a client flees the jurisdiction in violation of a
custody order. For example, in In re Rosenfeld139 the client was given tem-
porary custody of her daughter, but the father was given visitation rights
on weekends. Concerned that the father had been sexually abusing the
child, the client filed a relief-from-abuse petition to prevent the father
from further visits. The court consolidated the relief-from-abuse petition
with the permanent custody hearing and refused to prohibit the father from
visiting his daughter on the one weekend remaining before the hearing.140
The lawyer told the mother that he could not advise her to violate the
court order granting the father visitation rights. However, "he told her that
he did not think that the judge would hold it against her if she denied vis-
itation.""' He suggested that if she planned to violate the court order, she
137. Id.
138. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.2(d) (2002).
139. In re Rosenfeld, 601 A.2d 972 (Vt.1991), cert. denied, Rosenfeld v. Vermont, 112 S.Ct.
1968 (1992). See Joel S. Newman, Legal Advice Towards Illegal Ends, 28 U. RICH. L. REv. 287
(1994).
140. Rosenfeld, 601 A.2d at 975.
141. Id.
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and her daughter should leave home for the weekend. This tactic would
allow her to avoid a direct confrontation with her ex-husband.
The court referred the matter to a fact-finding committee of the Vermont
Bar, which noted that "similar situations arose often in family practice and
many lawyers 'choose to assure the safety of the child over the sanctity of
the court order." 1 42 In view of "the jeopardy his client perceived in grant-
ing visitation, the inability to place the matter before the court prior to the
weekend visit, the loss of only one weekend visit, and the short time prior
to the court hearing," '143 the committee found no violation. The court
rejected the committee report, concluding that the factors relied upon by
the committee could be used to mitigate punishment, but not to ignore the
violation. The lawyer was suspended for six months with his reinstate-
ment conditioned upon a passing score on a professional responsibility
exam and a demonstration of improved office management skills. 1"
While the lawyer's advice to the client to go out of town for the week-
end does push the bounds of what may be permissible under Comment 9
of Rule 1.2(d), the lawyer's advice to his client may be perceived by some
as a permissible honest opinion of potential consequences of depriving
visitation. Thus, counsel should be aware that individual judicial discre-
tion may result in disciplinary consequences for a lawyer despite her
belief that she was acting within the bounds of the Model Rules.
3. APPROACHES TO CLIENT ADVOCACY
The ethical questions raised by these scenarios can be discussed within
a context of empowerment based approaches to representing survivors of
domestic violence. Approaches to representing victims of domestic violence
can generally be divided into two categories: directive and empowering. 145
The directive model is most closely aligned with the traditional approach
to lawyering employed by most lawyers. Under that model, the lawyer
tells her client what she ought to do, given the lawyer's assessment of the
client's situation. 146 The empowerment model is quite contrary to the tra-
ditional style of lawyering employed by the directive model, and places an
emphasis on allowing the client to maintain a sense of autonomy through-
out the legal process. 147 Under the empowerment model, the client is the
decision-maker. 14" The lawyer simply provides information in a setting
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Erin L. Han, Note: Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim Empowerment in
Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159 (2003).
146. DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH
17-18 (1991).
147. Id.
148. Id.
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that is safe and conducive for contemplation and ultimately allows the client
to decide what to do with her situation. 149 The client-empowerment based
model of lawyering is widely advocated and used among lawyers for sur-
vivors of domestic violence across the country. The guidance provided by
the Comments to the Model Rules suggests that this approach to client
advocacy, with its focus on discussions of options and legal implications,
results in the best representation of battered clients while better assuring
the lawyer's compliance with the bounds of professional conduct.
C. Rule 1.6: Arguments Against Mandatory
Disclosure of a Client's Whereabouts
Model Rule 1.6 raises additional ethical concerns for lawyers repre-
senting clients who wish to flee the jurisdiction. This rule establishes the
scope of lawyer-client privilege and provides for exceptions to such priv-
ilege when a client has committed a crime or an act of fraud. Under Rule
1.6, a lawyer may be required to disclose the whereabouts of her client or
face contempt. Cases on this matter has been varied and is highly fact spe-
cific. The primary arguments that support nondisclosure of the client's
whereabouts are (1) the safety of the client and her children and (2) the
best interests of the children.
Some courts have not required lawyers to disclose the client's where-
abouts on the grounds that such disclosure would jeopardize the safety of
the client. 5° In Taylor v. Taylor, a divorce action, the wife was awarded
custody of the couple's child.' Subsequently, the former husband sought
modification of the decree. The lawyer was not retained by the wife fol-
lowing the finalization of the divorce. Notice of the modification action
was not served on the former wife, but was served on the lawyer. Neither
the ex-wife, nor anyone on her behalf, appeared before the court with
respect to the former husband's petition. When the trial court directed the
lawyer to divulge the former wife's address, the lawyer refused and was
subsequently held in contempt. 15 2 The lawyer insisted that the former wife
communicated her address to him in the strictest confidence and the reason
for not revealing her address involved her genuine fear for the safety of
herself and her child. In reversing the contempt finding, the appellate court
indicated that the most important fact it considered was that the confiden-
149. Id.
150. See generally Shelly K. Hillyer, The Lawyer-Client Privilege, Ethical Rules of
Confidentiality, and Other Arguments Bearing on Disclosure of a Fugitive Client's
Whereabouts, 68 TEMPLE. L. REv. 307 (1995).
151. Taylor v. Taylor, 359 N.E.2d 820 (I11. App. Ct. 1977).
152. Taylor, 359 N.E.2d at 821.
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tiality of the communication was based on the former wife's established
fear of harassment from the former husband. The court felt that a client in
this type of situation should not have to worry whether a court might com-
pel her lawyer to disclose information that would threaten her safety. The
court acknowledged that compelled disclosure in this type of case would
"seriously undermine the ability of lawyers to handle these delicate, explo-
sive situations in the future." '15 3
While Taylor offers strong arguments in favor of maintaining the con-
fidentiality of a fleeing client's whereabouts, some other jurisdictions
have mandated disclosure of such information under the "crime or fraud"
exception to the lawyer-client privilege.154 Each of these cases has involved
a client who violated a court order. Once again, a client's flight from the
jurisdiction in violation of a custody order can have negative consequences
not only for the client, but her lawyer as well. Taylor does, however, estab-
lish a precedent whereby flight from violence, even when in violation of
a court order, can avoid ethical consequences. Accordingly, some of these
cases have distinguished Taylor as applicable to situations where safety
was a motivating concern for maintaining confidentiality.155
These ethical questions should serve as a guide for lawyers representing
survivors fleeing domestic violence. The need for zealous, competent, sen-
sitive legal assistance is critical to the positive resolution of a custodial
interference/interstate custody battle.
VI. Conclusion
There are several strategies for advising survivors who wish to flee the
state with children.'56 The complex intersections of criminal custodial inter-
ference statutes with immigration provisions can make the systemic barriers
faced by immigrant survivors of intimate partner violence who hope to
escape abuse and remain in this country seem insurmountable. A basic
awareness of the consequences that may arise from these legal intersec-
tions can provide an immigrant survivor with the information and counsel
she may need to attain the safety she desires for herself and her children.
A lawyer advising a client who is considering fleeing across state lines
153. Id. at 142.
154. Hillyer, supra note 150, at 319. See Matter of Jacqueline F., 391 N.E.2d 967 (1979);
Jafarian-Kerman v. Jafarian-Kerman, 424 S.W.2d 333 (1967).
155. See Hillyer, supra note 150, at 319. See, e.g., Jacqueline F., 391 N.E.2d 967 (1979)
(suggesting that the "malicious and wanton" disobedience of a court order may be distinguished
from a survivor's desire to flee from abuse to ensure the safety and best interests of her child.)
See generally Paul D. Knothe, & Amy Horowitz, Walking the Tightrope Between Advising and
Assisting Clients With Criminal or Fraudulent Conduct: Can the ABA Provide Better
Guidance?, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 809 (2002).
156. Goelman, supra note 15.
148 Family Law Quarterly, Volume 39, Number 1, Spring 2005
with her children to escape an abusive partner must consider numerous
factors. Above all, a survivor will need to evaluate what will best keep her
and her children safe. A survivor is best equipped to assess her own safety
when considering how her abusive partner may retaliate. If she fears that
her abuser will harm or kill her or their children, and is convinced that no
intervention by the legal system will prevent him from retaliating, this must
guide her decision-making.157 Her decision will also depend upon the pro-
tections available to her in each state, such as family support, supportive
friends, economic opportunities, responsiveness of the community to domes-
tic violence, services to assist domestic violence victims, and the legal
protections available for her and her children in each state. Understanding
the laws related to custody jurisdiction, relocation, and flight across state or
tribal lines is critical to assisting the survivor to make an informed decision
about her safety and the safety of her children.
The following list of questions and answers are designed to guide lawyers
though the process of determining how to advise a battered immigrant
client contemplating fleeing with her children to another jurisdiction. This
section of questions is followed by a chart that summarizes state statutes
and provides lawyers with an overview of each state's approach to the issues
discussed in this chapter. This chart is intended to provide a starting point
for your research on these issues.
1. What type of parental kidnapping, custodial interference, or child
concealment law does the original state have?
As discussed above, a survivor and her lawyer should understand how
the law defines and treats crimes of parental kidnapping/custodial inter-
ference. While some state criminal custodial interference laws do not apply
as long as no court order is in effect, other states criminalize depriving the
other parent of contact with the children whether or not a custody order is
in effect. Consult your state statutes to determine whether such statutes are
applicable to your client. Inapplicability of criminal custodial interference
statutes does not necessarily mean that your client will not be penalized
for fleeing custody actions initiated subsequent to her flight.
2. Is there a defense or exemption related to domestic violence that
could protect your client from criminal charges if she flees across
state lines with the children?
157. A survivor's fears of her abuser's retaliation and/or the difficulty of enforcing civil pro-
tection orders should be recognized and validated. While law enforcement response to domestic
violence has greatly improved, such response is not yet universal. See, e.g., Gonzales v. City of
Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093 (2004) (Police officers' failure to enforce valid domestic abuse
restraining order issued under statute mandating enforcement of such orders deprives protected
party of property interest without procedural due process in violation of Fourteenth Amendment).
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Your client may be able to benefit from a variety of state law exemp-
tions or affirmative defenses to parental kidnapping/custodial interference
charges. Some state laws exempt flight from domestic violence from appli-
cability under their criminal custodial interference statutes'58 or include
flight from domestic violence as an affirmative defense under the state
statute.'59 A few laws permit flight from the jurisdiction, but then require
survivors to meet certain conditions, such as making a report to law enforce-
ment and commencing a custody case within a reasonable period of time
after fleeing the state."6 Others permit flight to protect the parent'16 or the
child from imminent harm. 162 Others have a general "good cause" defense,163
or rely upon the criminal defense of necessity. 1'I
Before fleeing with the children, survivors should know whether they
might rely on any exemptions in the event that criminal charges are brought
against them. Charges of parental kidnapping/custodial interference can
result in jail time or loss of custody.
3. If your client is a battered immigrant and is not a citizen of the United
States, what are the possibilities that either the original state or the
new state could prosecute her for parental kidnapping or custodial
interference and how do you assess the potential harm to her future
eligibility for legal immigration status?
First assess whether your client may qualify for VAWA or U Visa
immigration relief, and determine whether the abusive spouse or parent
has filed immigration papers for her and/or her children. Many victims
will qualify to file a VAWA self-petition, a U Visa application 165 or for
VAWA cancellation of removal. Assess the strength of her immigration
case and initiate that case. Determine what, if any, criminal prosecution or
sanctions for violation of existing court orders could occur if the victim
fled the jurisdiction with her children. Consult an expert on immigration
law and crimes to determine what effect any criminal conviction based on
a court's finding that the victim has violated court orders could have on
her attaining approval of her domestic violence-related immigration case,
and her attaining lawful permanent residence in light of that conviction. 166
158. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 787.03(6) (2004).
159. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5(c)(3) (2004).
160. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.7(c) (2004).
161. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-4506(2)(b) (2004).
162. See, e.g., id. § 18-4506(2)(a).
163. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-726(2) (2004).
164. See, e.g., Gerlach v. State, 699 P.2d 358 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (explains necessity
defense to a criminal custodial interference matter).
165. See Alternative Forms of Relief for Battered Immigrants and Immigrant Victims of
Crime: U Visas and Gender-based Asylum , in BREAKING BARRIERS, supra note 2, at § 3.6.
166. See, Battered Immigrants and the Criminal Legal System, in BREAKING BARRIERS, supra
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4. What type of relocation statute does the state have?
State civil laws also vary by jurisdiction as to whether, and under what
circumstances, they permit a parent who has custody of the child to leave
the state. Depending upon the state's relocation law and a general sense
of typical court rulings, a survivor may wish to petition the court to relo-
cate prior to leaving the state. Thoroughly consult your state's relevant
statutes and case law to understand the statutory and applied parameters
of such laws. Contact your state domestic violence coalition for a list of
lawyers who can advise you on family court practice in your area. Urge
your state to adopt the Model Code's provisions that emphasize the impor-
tance of considering domestic violence in custody and relocation cases.
5. Would a survivor be violating a court order by fleeing the jurisdiction?
Most states allow victims to file for and receive protection orders in the
state to which they flee, even when the violence occurred in another
state.167 However, the victim may choose not to obtain a protection order
in the new state for safety reasons so as to not provide the abuser infor-
mation about her location. The protection order case will require service
of documents on the abuser. Some victims only seek orders in the new
state when the abuser knows or learns she has relocated there.
Courts generally disfavor intentional violations of valid court orders.
Barring immediate safety concerns, survivors should, if at all possible, ask
a court to modify an existing custody or visitation order prior to leaving
the state. If no order exists, a survivor may not wish to obtain a protection
order prior to fleeing the state; protection orders may grant visitation to
the perpetrator and thereby increase the chances that a battered parent
would violate the visitation provisions of such an order if forced to leave
the jurisdiction for safety reasons.
6. How have courts in each of the states typically handled interstate
custody matters that involved domestic violence?
It will be useful for a survivor to know whether courts in the original
state and in the new state tend to penalize victims of domestic violence in
child custody cases for flight across state lines.
7. Do the two states have different custody laws related to domestic
violence?
Custody laws vary greatly, and one state may consider domestic vio-
lence to a greater degree in custody decisions than the other state. This
note 2, at § 7. For referrals to immigration lawyers, contact: National Immigration Project -
gail@nationalimmigrationproject.org or The Immigrant Women Program of Legal Momentum
at IWP@legalmomentum.org or 202-326-0040.
167. Klein & Orloff, supra note 2.
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legal standard in each state may be important for a survivor to know prior
to flight from abuse.
8. Do the states have different laws protecting the confidentiality of
information about domestic violence survivors?
If a domestic violence survivor needs to have her identifying informa-
tion such as address or telephone number kept confidential for safety rea-
sons, she should be aware of what the different states' laws require with
respect to confidentiality.
9. When can a court modify a custody or visitation order that was
issued by a court in another state?
The federal PKPA gives continuing jurisdiction to the state that issued
the initial custody determination. 168 The issuing state then retains juris-
diction over the matter as long as it can do so under state law, and at least
one parent or the child continues to live there. A court may modify a cus-
tody or visitation order from another state only if (1) it has jurisdiction to
do so, and (2) the court of the initial state no longer has jurisdiction or has
declined to exercise it.' 69
168. See previous discussion of PKPA, UCCJEA, UCCJA jurisdictional issues concerning
modification of a custody or visitation order. Also see MODEL CODE ON DOMEsnc AND FAMILY
VIOLENCE, supra note 102.
169. See, e.g., Stoneman v. Drollinger, 64 P.3d. 997, 997, 1005-1006 (Mont. 2003) ("[T]he
protection of the parties, the years the children had resided in Washington, the significant dis-
tance between courts, the parties' disparate financial circumstances, the location of evidence
and convenience of witnesses, and the familiarity factors, all supported the trial court declining
jurisdiction to allow the Washington court to exercise jurisdiction" after mother fled from
Oregon to Washington due to domestic violence).
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Appendix A
State A) Intrastate Penalty Available Applicability of Statute
Statute Citation (Max. Sentence) Defenses
(Statute Title) B) Interstate Penalty Notes
(Max. Sentence)
Alabama A/B) Class C felony No crime if sole purpose is to assume Not likely to be applicable
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-45 (10 yrs) lawful control of child, to parents. (No crime if sole
(Interference with purpose is to assume lawful
Custody) control of child.)
Alaska A) Class A misdemeanor 1) General just excuse defense Ambiguous-see case law
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.320 (1 yr) "includes illness of child" ("knowing that the person
(Custodial Interference B) Class C felony 2) See case law for DV exception, has no legal right to do so").
1st Degree) Note: Withholding of visita-
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.330 tion also violates this statute.
(2nd Degree) (ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.125)
Arizona Custodial Interference: Defense available IF: Applicable w/ or w/o
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. A) Class 6 felony (I yr) I) Defendant has begun protection order custody/visitation order
§ 13-1302 B) Class 4 felony or custody proceeding and the petition
(Custodial Interference) states defendant's belief that child Note: Mother is legal
ARtz. REV. STAT. ANN. Access Interference: was at risk with other parent AND custodian of child until
§ 13-1305 A) Class 2 misdemeanor 2) defendant is child's parent with "right paternity is established.
(Access Interference) B) Class 5 felony of custody"AND either a) has a good
faith and reasonable belief that the
removal isnecessary to protect child
from imminent harm or b) is a victim
of DV and has reasonable belief that
child will be inimmediate danger if
left with other parent
Arkansas A) Class A misdemeanor Affirmative defense: imminent harm Custody/visitation order req.
ARK. CODE ANN. ( yr) to child for applicability
§ 5-26-502 B) Class D felony (6 yrs)
(Interference with Custody)
California A) I yr to 2, 3, or 4 yrs Statute inapplicable for victim of DV Applicable w/ or w/o
CAL. PENAL CODE § 278 B) 1 yr to 2, 3, or 4 yrs who reasonably believes that child, if custody/visitation order
(Child Abduction) left with other parent, will suffer physical
Aggravation for int'l or emotional harm. Defendant must: Notes:
abduction 1) make a custody petition pursuant to 1) See Uniform Parentage Act
UCCJEA /PKPA, for standard in the absence
2) make report to DA of child's original of a custody/visitation
state with contact info of child & order.
parent detailing reasons for fleeing and 2) Statute language includes
3) inform law enforcement re: any "maliciously."
changes in address See CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.7
Colorado A) Class 5 felony Affirmative defense: "Offender Custody/visitation order
COLO. REv. STAT. (Up to 3 yrs) reasonably believed that his conduct req. for applicability
§ 18-3-304 B) Class 5 felony was necessary" to safeguard child
(Violation of Custody (Up to 3 yrs)
Order) Int'l - Class 4 felony
Connecticut A) Class A misdemeanor NO STATUTORY DEFENSE Ambiguous--see case law
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Up to I yr) ("knowing he has no right to
§ 53a-97 B) Class D felony do so").
(Custodial Interference (1-5 yrs) See State v. Vakilzaden, 742
1st Degree) A. 2d 767, 771 (Conn. 1999)
CoN . GEN. STAT. ANN. ("the father and mother of
§ 53a-98 (2nd Degree) every minor child are joint
guardians")
Delaware A) Class A misdemeanor NO STATUTORY DEFENSE Ambiguous - see case law
DEL. CODE ANN. (1 yr) ("knowing the person has no
tit. 11, § 785 B) Class G felony legal right to do so")
(Interference with Custody) (1-2 yMs max)
District of Columbia A) Misdemeanor Statute NOT violated if: Applicable w/ or w/o
D.C. CODE §§ 16-1021 B) Felony conviction, 1) Action was taken by the "parent custody/visitation order
to 1026 if abduction is for fleeing from imminent physical harm
(Parental Kidnapping) over 30 days to parent" or
(imprisonment for I yr) 2) To protect child
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Florida A/B) Felony of 3rd degree Defense that: Applicable w/ or w/o
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 787.03 (5 yrs max.) I) Defendant was victim of DV and custody/visitation order.
(Interference with Custody) 2) That act was required to protect child Statute uses: "malicious
BUT MUST: intent to deprive another
1) W/in 10 days report name, new person" language.
address, and reason for flight, Higher penalties if
2) Begin custody proceeding consistent contrary to court order.
with PKPA/UCCJA, and
3) Inform former state of child's
whereabouts
Georgia A/B) Misdemeanor NO STATUTORY DEFENSE Applicable w/ or w/o
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-45 (felony upon 3rd custody/visitation order
(Interference with Custody) conviction)
Hawaii A/B) Class C felony "Good cause" to believe act was for the Applicable w/ or w/o
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. (5 yes) protection of the child from immediate custody/visitation order
§§ 707 to 727 bodily injury
(Custodial Interference
1st and 2nd degree)
Idaho A) Misdemeanor Afflirmative defenses: Applicable w/ or w/o
IDAHO CODE § 18-4506 (if child returned prior 1) DV custody/visitation order
(Child Custody to arrest) 2) Protection of child
Interference) B) Felony
Illinois A/B) Class 4 felony Statute not violated if child is taken Applicable w/ or w/o
720 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. (I yr) to a DV shelter custody/visitation order
5/10-5 Affirmative defense: Fleeing DV if parents are married.
(Child Abduction) Note: Mother presumed to
have custody if unmarried,
and/or father is paying
child support.
Indiana A) 1. Class C misdemeanor NO STATUTORY DEFENSE Ambiguous-see case law
IND. CODE § 35-42-3-4 w/o court order, 2.
(Interference with Custody) Class B if in violation Note: Statute IS applicable
of a court order w/ or w/o custody order
B) 1. Penalty unclear w/o as a Class C misdemeanor
court order, 2. Class D for concealment of the child.
felony if in violation
of a court order
Iowa A/B) Class D felony NO STATUTORY DEFENSE Custody/visitation order
IOWA CODE § 710.6 (5 yrs) req. for applicability
(Violating Custodial Order) If violation of visitation
order, serious misdemeanor
Kansas A/B) Class A misdemeanor NO STATUTORY DEFENSE Applicable w/ or w/o
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3422 custody/visitation order.
(Interference with Note: Aggravated interference
Parental Custody) if child is concealed in
See factors for aggravation unknown place: Severity
Level 7 person felony
Kentucky A/B) Class D felony NO STATUTORY DEFENSE Ambiguous-see case law
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. (1-5 yrs) Defense does exist if the child is ("knowing he has no legal
§ 509.070 returned voluntarily by the parent before right to do so")
(Custodial Interference) an arrest or before issuance of warrant.
Louisiana A/B) Simple kidnapping: Simple kidnapping: Custody/visitation order
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. (5 yrs) NO STATUTORY DEFENSE req. for applicability of
§ 14:45 A/B) Interference with Interference w/ custody defense: both (possible to be charged
(Simple Kidnapping) custody: (6 in) Action necessary to protect child with both simple kidnapping
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. and custodial interference)
§ 14:45.1
(Interference with
Custody of a Child)
Maine A/B) Class C crime NO STATUTORY DEFENSE Applicable w/ or w/o
17-A ME. REV. STAT. (5 yes) custody/visitation order
§ 303 for interstate removal
(Criminal Restraint by
a Parent)
Maryland A) Misdemeanor (30 day May file a petition in court of equity Custody/visitation order
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. imprisonment) stating: req. for applicability
LAW §§ 9-304 & -305 B) Felony, if abduction for 1) Threat to child's health or safety and
(Prohibited acts wfm and more than 30 days (I yr) 2) wish to modify custody order,
w/out state) International abduction is Note: Defense may only be used if
a felony (3 yr) petition filed 96 hours of the abduction
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Massachusetts A) (I yr) NO STATUTORY DEFENSE Ambiguous-see case law
MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. B) (5 yrs) ("without lawful authority")
ch. 265, § 26A
(Custodial Interference
by Relatives)
Michigan A/B) Felony Complete defense if action is taken to Custody/visitation order
MtCH. COMP. LAWS ANN. (I yr and I day) protect child from imminent and "actual req. for applicability
§ 750.350a threat of physical or mental harm, abuse,
(Taking or Retaining or neglect."
Child...)
Minnesota A/B) (Max of 2-4 yrs) Affirmative defenses Applicable w/or w/o
MINN. STAT. § 609.26 1) DV/Sexual assault exception custody/visitation order.
(Depriving Another of 2) Child protection exception (Some ambiguity-
Custodial or Parental see case law.)
Rights)
Mississippi A) N/A NO STATUTORY DEFENSE Custody/visitation order
MISs. CODE ANN. B) Felony (3 yrs) req. for applicability
§ 973-51 (Interstate only)
(Interstate Removal of
Child Under Age Fourteen
by Noncustodial Parent
or Relative)
Missouri A/B) Class D felony Absolute defense: Fleeing a pattern or Interference with custody:
Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.150 (10 yrs) incident of domestic violence Ambiguous-see case law
(Interference with Custody) ("knowing that he has no
Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.153 legal right to do so").
(Parental Kidnapping) Parental Kidnapping:
Custody/visitation order
req. for applicability
Montana A/B (10 yr max) NO STATUTORY DEFENSE Parenting interference:
MONT. CODE ANN. Defense for interference w/parent child Applicable w/ or w/o
§ 45-5-634 contact: Reasonable cause custody/visitation order.
(Parenting Interference) Interference with parent-child
MONT. CODE ANN. contact: Custody/visitation
§§ 45-5-632 & 633 order req. for applicability
(Interference or Aggrav.
Int. with Parent-Child
Contact)
Nebraska A) Class I1 misdemeanor, NO STATUTORY DEFENSE Applicable w/ or w/o
NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-316 w/o custody order custody/visitation order
(Violation of Custody) (6 months)
B) Class IV felony, w/
custody order (5 yrs)
Nevada A/B) Category D felony Exceptions for: Custody/visitation order
NEV. REV. STAT. 200.359 (1-4 yrs) 1) DV or req. for applicability
(Detention, Concealment 2) Child welfare IF detention is reported
or Removal of Child to law enforcement or child welfare
from Person Having services within 24 boors after removal
Lawful Custody or from of the child or reasonable time
Jurisdiction of Court) thereafter
New Hampshire A) Misdemeanor Intrastate - "good faith protection of Ambiguous-see case law.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. B) Class B felony child"; must show petition documenting (See RSA 458:17 for
§ 633:4 (1-7 yrs) danger and requesting modification of definition of "lawful physical
(Interference with custody within 72 hours of abduction, custody.")
Custody) Interstate: NO STATUTORY DEFENSE
New Jersey A) 3rd degree crime Affirmative defense: Applicable w/ or w/o
N.J. STAT. ANN. (No imprisonment) I) Child welfare if a report is made custody/visitation order
§ 2C: 13-4 B) 2nd degree crime if within 24 after removal of the child (Some ambiguity-see
(Interference with outside United States in the new jurisdiction case law.)
Custody) or if child is concealed 2) Domestic violence if notice of
for over 24 hours child's whereabouts is given to law
enforcement OR if a new custody
action is commenced
New Mexico AB) 4th degree felony NO STATUTORY DEFENSE Applicable w/or w/o
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-4-4 (18 months) custody/visitation order
(Custodial Interference) Note: Language includes
'maliciously"
Border Crossings 155
New York A) Class A misdemeanor Affirmative defense: Emergency to Ambiguous-see case law
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 135.50 B) Class E felony protect child victim from abuse
(Custodial Interference (4 yrs)
in the 1st Degree)
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.45
(Custodial Interference
in the 2d Degree)
North Carolina A) N/A NO STATUTORY DEFENSE Custody/visitation order
N.C. GEN. STAT. B) Class I felony req. for applicability
§ 14-320.1 (5 yrs)
(Transporting Child
Outside the State with the
Intent to Violate Custody
Order)
North Dakota A) N/A NO STATUTORY DEFENSE Custody/visitation order
N.D. CErr. CoDE B) Class C felony req. for applicability
§ 12.1-18-05
(Removal of Child from
State in Violation of
Custody Order)
Ohio A) 1st degree misdemeanor Affirmative Defense: Ambiguous-see case law
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. B) Felony - 5th degree 1) Child's health/safety and ("knowing the person is
§ 2919.23 2) In good faith gave notice to law without privilege to do so")
(Interference with Custody) enforcement as to whereabouts of the
child within reasonable amount of time
Oklahoma A/B) Felony NO STATUTORY DEFENSE Applicable w/Or w/o
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 891 custody/visitation order
(Child Stealing) (Some ambiguity-see
case law.)
Oregon A) Class C felony NO STATUTORY DEFENSE Ambiguous-see case law
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.245 (5 yes) ("no legal right to do so")
(Custodial Interference B) Class B felony
in the 2d Degree) (10 yrs)
OR. REV. STAT.§ 163.257
(Custodial Interference
in the 1st Degree)
Pennsylvania A/B) Felony 3rd degree I) Child welfare Custodial interference statute:
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2904 (Both) 2) Defendant is parent and there is no Ambiguous-see case law
(interference with Custody court order of custody ("when he has no privilege
of Children) 3) For concealment statute, there is a to do so")
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2909 "reasonable response to DV" defense
(Concealment of
Whereabouts of a Child)
Rhode Island A/B) Felony (2 yr) Child snatching: DV Affirmative defense Custody/visitation order
R.I. GEN. LAws Abduction: Statute inapplicable if req. for applicability
§ 11-26-1.1 abduction is to protect child from
(Childsnatching) imminent OR if fleeing DV
R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 11-26-1.2
(Abduction of Child
Prior to Court Order)
South Carolina A) N/A NO STATUTORY DEFENSE Custody/visitation order
S.C. CODE ANN. B) Felony (max 5 yrs) req. for applicability
§ 16-17-495
(Custodial Interference)
South Dakota A) Class I misdemeanor Defense: Only if other lawful custodian Custody/visitation order
S.D. CODwirD LAws (Ist offense, then fails to report abduction within 90 days req. for applicability
§ 22-19-9 Class 6 felony)
(Violation of Custody B) Class 5 felony
Order by Parent) (5 yrs)
S.D. CoDnon' LAws
§ 22-19-10
(Removal of Child
from State)
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Tennessee A/B) Class E felony Defense if "clear and present danger" Custody/visitation order
TENN. CODE ANN. (1-6 yrs) to child or child returned before arrest req. for applicability
§ 39-13-306 Note: Class A misdemeanor
(Custodial Interference) if child is voluntarily returned
Texas A/B) "State Jail" felony NO STATUTORY DEFENSE Custody/visitation order
TEx. PENAL COnE ANN. req. for applicability
§ 25.03
(Interference with Child
Custody)
Utah A) Class A misdemeanor Defense: Good cause Custody/visitation order
UTAH CODE ANN. ( yr) req. for applicability
§ 76-5-303 B) Felony 3rd degree
(Custodial Interference) (5 yrs)
Vermont A/B) (Max 5 yrs) Defense: Good faith act to protect child Can show defense by filing
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, modification of custody in
§ 2451 VT court within 72 hours.
(Custodial Interference) Ambiguous-see case law
("no legal right to do so")
Virginia Kidnapping: Justification or excuse Kidnapping: Ambiguous-
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-47 A) Class I misdemeanor + see case law ("withholds
(Abduction and contempt (Up to 12 mo) from another entitled to his
Kidnapping Defmed) B) Class 6 felony charge").
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-49. (5 yrs) + contempt Violation of court order of
(Violation of Court Order Violation of court order custody: Custody/visitation
Regarding Custody and of custody: A) (Fine) order req. for applicability
Visitation) B) (5 yrs)
Washington A/B) Class C felony 1) Protection of child Ambiguous - see case law
WASH. REv. CODE (5 yrs) 2) Flight from DV ("intent to deny child
§§ 9A.40.060 & 9A.40.070 Note: Must show that defendant sought access" for custody (Ist)
(Custodial Interference in assistance of police before fleeing or visitation (2nd))
the 1st and 2nd Degree)
WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.40.080
(Custodial Interference -
Defense)
West Virginia A/B) Felony (I -5 yrs) Welfare of child Ambiguous-wer case lass
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-14d ("Intent to deprive another
(Concealment or Removal person of lawful custody")
of Minor Child from
Custodian or from Person
Entitled to Visitation)
Wisconsin A/B) Class F felony Affirmative defense: Taken by parent Applicable w/ or w/o
WIs. STAT. § 948.31 (2 yrs, 6 mo) fleeing DV/SA custody/visitation order
(Interference with Custody
by Parent or Others)
Wyoming A/B) (Not more than Affirmative defense: Welfare of child Ambiguous-see case law
Wyo. STAT. Arm. § 6-2-204 2 years) in immediate danger ("having no privilege to
(Interference with Custody) do so").
Note: Concealment of child
in confidential location a
felony with maximum
sentence of 5 yrs.
